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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE SUPREME COURT GETS CONSTRUCTIVE: A CASE NOTE ON
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE v. SUDERS

I. INTRODUCTION
What if an employee, after quitting her job, alleges that her workplace was
so pervasively offensive and discriminatory that she had no choice but to quit?
Not only that, but she wants to be compensated for her resignation. Does the
employee have this ability? Does the employer have any recourse?
According to the United States Supreme Court the answer is: it depends.
These were the issues faced by the Supreme Court when it decided
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders,1 in which the Court analyzed the concepts
of sexually hostile work environment and constructive discharge, and the
liability of the employer for such occurrences.2 The Court granted certiorari to
expound upon its twin 1998 decisions of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth3
and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.4 The Court needed to provide guidance
as to when an employer may utilize the affirmative defense articulated in
Ellerth and Faragher in constructive discharge situations.5 The Court
examined the Ellerth–Faragher framework to determine whether constructive
discharge hostile environment claims allow the employer to raise an
affirmative defense or require the employer to be held strictly liable.6 The
Court’s answer to whether employers will be strictly liable or will be able to
affirmatively defend is dependent upon whether or not an “official act” by the
supervisor induced the employee’s resignation.7 The official act requirement
necessarily begs the question of what constitutes an official act by a
supervisor? Unfortunately, even after Suders, the answer remains unclear.
In Suders, the Court analyzed a subset of cases in which a Title VII
constructive discharge is the result of a supervisor-induced hostile work
environment.8 While the Suders decision may appear limited in scope, the

1. 542 U.S. 129 (2004). Throughout this Note, the Supreme Court decision will be referred
to as “Suders” and the circuit court decision will be referred to as “Easton.”
2. Id. at 133.
3. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
4. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
5. Suders, 542 U.S. at 139–40.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 140–41.
8. Id. at 142.
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potential impact of the decision was such that the Supreme Court’s grant of
certiorari resulted in amicus filings from businesses, government, women’s
rights organizations, and many other entities.9 To decide the question
presented in Suders, the Court examined the existing hostile work environment
jurisprudence developed in Ellerth and Faragher.10 The Court explained that
the Ellerth–Faragher framework established that an employer is vicariously
liable to an employee who is subjected to an actionable hostile work
environment created by a supervisor with immediate or higher authority over
the employee.11 Under the Ellerth–Faragher framework, the plaintiff must
prove that the supervisor-induced hostile work environment culminated in a
tangible employment action in order for the employer to be strictly liable for
the actions of its supervisors.12 If the plaintiff is unable to prove the
supervisor-induced hostile work environment culminated in a tangible
employment action, the employer may affirmatively defend against the
imposition of vicarious liability by asserting the Ellerth–Faragher defense.13
In Suders, the plaintiff claimed she was constructively discharged due to
the hostile work environment created by the actions of her supervisors, and as
such, her employer should be liable under Title VII.14 A “constructive
discharge” is defined as a situation where pervasive harassment causes the
9. The following briefs were filed as amici curiae for the respondent: Brief for the Lawyers’
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent,
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 524 U.S. 129 (2004) (No. 03–95), 2004 WL 419432; Brief
of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondent, Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 524 U.S. 129 (2004) (No. 03–95),
2004 WL 363887. The following briefs were filed as amici curiae for the petitioner: Brief
Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council in Support of Petitioner,
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 524 U.S. 129 (2004) (No. 03–95), 2004 WL 110582; Brief
Amicus Curiae of the Society for Human Resource Management in Support of the Petitioner,
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 524 U.S. 129 (2004) (No. 03–95), 2004 WL 110583; Brief
of Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 524 U.S. 129 (2004) (No. 03–95), 2004 WL 110584. Finally
the United States also filed a brief: Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Pennsylvania
State Police v. Suders, 524 U.S. 129 (2004) (No. 03–95), 2004 WL 121589. Additionally, the
Supreme Court granted the Solicitor General’s motion for leave to participate in oral argument as
amicus curiae and for divided argument. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 541 U.S. 929
(2004). A transcript of the oral argument is available at 2004 WL 772081.
10. Suders, 542 U.S. at 143–46.
11. Id. at 144–45.
12. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
13. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
14. Suders, 542 U.S. at 133. It should be noted that supervisory participation is not a
requirement for a cognizable hostile environment constructive discharge claim. Caridad v.
Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 294 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Co-workers, as well as
supervisors, can cause the constructive discharge of an employee.”). This is a distinction which is
important to the holding of Suders.
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work environment to be so unbearable that resignation from the job is a
reasonable response.15 In constructive discharge claims, the plaintiff tries to
establish that resignation was caused by the hostile environment created by the
employer and, as such, that the resultant constructive discharge should be
regarded as an involuntary termination.16 The Suders Court was faced with
determining whether a supervisor-induced constructive discharge is the
equivalent of a tangible employment action for Ellerth–Faragher analysis
purposes.17
In Suders, the Supreme Court recognized for the first time that a
constructive discharge is a cognizable claim under Title VII.18 As to the
possible imposition of strict liability against the employer for a constructive
discharge claim, the Court held that a constructive discharge is not
automatically equivalent to a tangible employment action for Ellerth–Faragher
analysis purposes.19 Rather, only when a constructive discharge is initiated by
“an official act of the enterprise” as the “last straw” before the plaintiff’s
resignation will the employer be held strictly liable.20 The employer will be
precluded from raising the Ellerth–Faragher affirmative defense when a
tangible employment action precipitates the constructive discharge.21 The
employer is strictly liable when an official action has been taken by the
supervisor because an “aided-by-the-agency-relation” is evident.22 In other
words, liability is imputed to the employer for the harassing acts of its

15. Suders, 542 U.S. at 141 (stating that the inquiry of whether a constructive discharge has
occurred is objective: “Did working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in
the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign?”). Black’s Law Dictionary defines
constructive discharge as: “A termination of employment brought about by making the
employee’s working conditions so intolerable that the employee feels compelled to leave.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 495 (8th ed. 2004).
16. Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 S.
CAL. L. REV. 307, 315 (2004).
17. Suders, 542 U.S. at 140 (stating that the Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit
split as to whether a supervisor-induced constructive discharge is a tangible employment action
that precludes the employer from asserting the Ellerth–Faragher affirmative defense). Circuit
interpretations varied regarding language in Ellerth, which stated essentially stated: “[W]hen a
supervisor takes a tangible employment action against a subordinate[,] . . . it would be
implausible to interpret agency principles to allow an employer to escape liability.” Id. at 145
(quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762–63).
18. While the circuits had long since recognized constructive discharge claims under many
types of Title VII claims, the Supreme Court had never formally recognized that such claims were
correct. See infra notes 189–94 and accompanying text.
19. Suders, 542 U.S. at 140–41.
20. See id. at 148.
21. Id. at 140–41.
22. See id. at 145, 148–49.
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supervisors because those harassing acts could not have occurred absent the
agency relationship.23
Although the Court held that for strict liability to attach to the employer the
supervisor must have effected an official act causing the resignation, the court
failed to establish exactly what constitutes an “official act.”24 The lack of
clarity regarding what constitutes an “official act” is likely to lead to great
confusion and inconsistent applications of the Suders holding by the circuits.
This Note analyzes the Suders Court’s reasoning and argues that while the
Court’s requirement of an “official act” precipitating the resignation was well
founded in light of Title VII objectives, agency principles, and hostile work
environment jurisprudence, the Court has left significant room for future
circuit splits due to its failure to ground the Suders decision with a definitive
explanation of what constitutes an “official act.”
Part II of this Note introduces the background of the Suders case and
summarizes the findings of the lower courts. Part III explains employer
liability for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and discusses the development of the constructive discharge doctrine. Part IV
examines the pre-Suders circuit split in which circuits made inconsistent
determinations as to whether constructive discharge constituted a tangible
employment action for Ellerth–Faragher analysis purposes. Part V analyzes
the Suders decision in light of agency principles and Title VII policy
considerations and then explains how the Court resolved the circuit split. Part
VI evaluates the Suders Court’s requirement of an official act, offers
suggestions as to what the parameters of an official act should be, analyzes
whether the Suders decision comports with agency principles, and explains the
burdens of persuasion set out in the decision. Part VII discusses future
recommendations regarding sexual harassment training, supervisory
responsibilities, and plaintiff duties in light of the Suders decision.
II. HARASSMENT BY THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE
The Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) hired Nancy Drew Suders in March
1998 as a police communications operator.25 Suders filed a discrimination
claim stating she was subjected to harassing behavior by her supervisors:
23. See id.
24. Suders, 542 U.S. at 140–41.
25. Id. at 134. Throughout the discussion of the facts it should be noted that the PSP
“‘vigorously dispute[s]’ the truth of Suders’ allegations, contending that some of the incidents she
describes ‘never happened at all,’ while ‘others took place in a context quite different from that
suggested by [Suders].’” Suders, 542 U.S. at 134, n.1. The recitation of facts is drawn from the
Supreme Court’s Suders decision and augmented with additional information included in the
Third Circuit’s Suders v. Easton decision. 325 F.3d 432, 436 (3d Cir. 2003). As the Supreme
Court noted, the recitation of facts is in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as PSP’s motion
for summary judgment was granted. Suders, 542 U.S. at 134.
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Sergeant Easton, Station Commander at the McConnellsburg barracks, Patrol
Corporal Baker, and Corporal Prendergast.26 Suders claimed various harassing
behaviors by the supervisors. For example, Suders claimed that many
inappropriate statements were made in the work environment. Suders stated
that Sergeant Easton would bring up bestiality whenever Suders entered his
office.27 Easton discussed with Prendergast, in front of Suders, how young
girls should be taught early how to properly give oral sex to men.28 Corporal
Baker would grab his crotch and yell, “Suck it,” in Suders’ presence as much
as five to ten times per night.29 When Suders once suggested that he should
not behave in such a manner at work, Baker responded by getting up on a chair
and repeating the process.30 Baker would also rub his behind in front of Suders
and ask her if she agreed that he had a “nice ass.”31 Corporal Prendergrast
would question Suders’ intelligence and abilities and would act forcefully with
her.32
The barrage of alleged harassment supposedly escalated after Prendergast
accused Suders of taking a missing file home with her.33 After Prendergast’s
accusation, Suders contacted the department’s Equal Employment Opportunity
(EEO) officer and informed her that she might need help.34 The EEO officer
26. Suders, 542 U.S. at 134–35. According to the background of the case, as reported in the
district court decision, Suders claimed that Easton told her before she started the job that he had
concerns about her. Easton, 325 F.3d at 436. Suders stated that Easton warned her that any later
allegations on her part would be her words against his. Id. See generally Enforcement Guidance:
Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, available at
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) [hereinafter EEOC
Enforcement Guidance] (providing the requirements for who qualifies as an advisor in Section
III).
27. Suders, 542 U.S. at 135. Suders said that every time she went into Easton’s office “he
would bring up [the subject of] people having sex with animals. . . . [T]hat’s all the man wanted
to talk about.” Easton, 325 F.3d at 436.
28. Suders, 542 U.S. at 135. Easton said that “if someone had a daughter, they should teach
her how to give a good blow job!” Easton, 325 F.3d at 436. Easton claimed that the statements
regarding bestiality and oral sex pertained to investigations. Id. at 437. Sergeant Easton would
also sit down near Suders, while wearing spandex shorts, and spread his legs far apart. Id. at 436.
29. Easton, 325 F.3d at 437. Suders said that the obscene gestures always followed the same
pattern. Id. Evidently Baker was trying to imitate a television professional wrestling move. Id.
According to Suders, Baker would “cross his hands, grab hold of his private parts and yell, suck
it.” Id. Suders said that he would also beat on his crotch while yelling “suck it.” Id. Suders
stated that all Baker wanted to do was “play with his crotch.” Id. Suders said that Baker would
also “ask me to do this garbage.” Id.
30. Suders, 542 U.S. at 135.
31. Id. at 135. Suders alleged that on one occasion Baker, without invitation, told Suders
that his wife intended to pierce her nipple and he intended to pierce his genitals. Easton, 325
F.3d at 437.
32. Suders, 542 U.S. at 135 (telling Suders that “the village idiot could do her job”).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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gave Suders her telephone number but neither person contacted the other.35
Two months later, Suders approached the EEO officer again, this time stating
that she was being harassed and was afraid.36 The EEO officer instructed
Suders to file a complaint, but did not tell her where or how to do so.37 Two
days after Suders last approached the EEO officer, she was arrested by her
supervisors for theft of PSP property.38
The PSP property Suders was arrested for stealing was computer
examinations.39 Suders had taken a computer-skills examination several times
trying to satisfy a requirement for her job.40 Suders was told that she failed the
exam every time she took the test.41 One day Suders happened upon her
computer-skills exams in a drawer in the women’s locker room, concluded that
her tests were never graded, and took the tests from the drawer.42 Suders’
supervisors discovered that the exams were missing, covered the drawer with a
theft-detection powder and waited for Suders to return the tests.43 When
Suders tried to put the tests back in the drawer, the powder turned her hands a
“telltale blue.”44 The supervisors arrested Suders upon viewing her blue
hands.45 Suders was handcuffed, photographed, and detained as a suspect.46
Prior to the day of her arrest, Suders had prepared a resignation letter that she
ultimately tendered on that day.47 Suders was not immediately released upon
tendering her resignation, although after she repeatedly stated that she quit, she
was released and no charges were pressed against her.48

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Suders, 542 U.S. at 135–36. In fact, to Suders the EEO officer’s response and demeanor
were “insensitive and unhelpful.” Id. at 136. “[T]he record in this case makes clear that an
important factor was the EEO officer’s failure to take any meaningful action when the plaintiff
complained, thereby making her feel helpless and hopeless and precipitating her resignation.”
Supreme Court Extends Sexual Harassment Defense to Constructive Discharge Claims, FAIR
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDELINES, Number 590, July 2004, at 1, 3 [hereinafter FAIR
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDELINES]. It is also notable that the Pennsylvania State Police was
under investigation generally for the “lax way it handles sexual-misconduct complaints against its
troopers.” Nicole Weisensee Egan, Court Rules Workers Forced to Leave Due to Sexual
Harassment Can Sue, KNIGHT RIDDER TRIBUNE BUSINESS NEWS, Jun. 15, 2004, at 1.
38. Suders, 542 U.S. at 136.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Suders, 542 U.S. at 136.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Suders, 542 U.S. at 136.
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Suders sued PSP in federal district court in September of 2000.49 Suders
claimed a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196450 alleging she
was sexually harassed and constructively discharged.51 Essentially, Suders
claimed that the workplace sexual harassment she experienced was so severe
that she had no other choice but to quit.52 Suders substantiated this “no choice
but to resign” position by claiming that in a five-month timeframe she was
continually harassed by her supervisors.53 Suders alleged that the harassment
ceased only upon her resignation.54
PSP filed a motion for summary judgment at the close of discovery and the
motion was granted by the district court.55 Although the district court
determined that Suders’ testimony was such that a trier of fact could conclude
that the supervisors had created a sexually hostile environment,56 the court held
PSP was not vicariously liable for the conduct of its employees.57 In so
holding, the district court relied on the 1998 twin Supreme Court decisions of
Ellerth and Faragher.58 In Ellerth and Faragher the Court distinguished
between supervisor harassment accompanied by an official act, and supervisor
harassment unaccompanied by an official act.59 The import of this distinction
is that supervisory harassment accompanied by an official act imputes strict
liability to the employer for the acts of the supervisors.60 It is important to note
that the district court found Suders’ hostile work environment claim untenable
as a matter of law.61 The district court found that Suders “unreasonably failed
to avail herself to the PSP’s internal procedures for reporting any
harassment.”62 Suders appealed the decision.63
49. Id.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2000e-17 (2000).
51. Suders, 542 U.S. at 136–37.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 135–37.
54. Id. at 135.
55. Id. at 137.
56. Suders, 542 U.S. at 137. “The essence of a ‘hostile environment’ claim is a ‘pattern or
practice’ of offensive behavior by the employer, a supervisor, co-workers, or non-employees so
‘severe or pervasive’ as to interfere with the employee’s job performance or create an abusive
work environment.” CHARLES V. DALE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL LAW 4 (2004).
57. Suders, 542 U.S. at 137.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 138.
62. Suders, 542 U.S. at 137–38.
63. See id. at 138. The district court reasoned that Suders had never given the PSP an
opportunity to address her complaints, as she resigned only two days after discussing actual
harassment with the Equal Employment Opportunity Officer. Id. Suders’ constructive discharge
claim was not addressed by the district court. Id.
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The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the
case.64 The Court of Appeals determined that the district court erred when it
failed to address Suders’ claim of supervisor-induced hostile environment
constructive discharge.65 The court decided that per its precedent, constructive
discharge was the functional equivalent of an actual termination.66 The Third
Circuit held that when a constructive discharge is proven, it amounts to a
tangible employment action for which the employer is strictly liable under the
Ellerth–Faragher framework, precluding the employer’s use of the affirmative
defense.67 The court opined that making the Ellerth–Faragher defense
available in constructive discharge cases might lead to undesired effects that
would be inconsistent with Title VII goals.68
PSP filed a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.69
The Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split regarding whether a
supervisor-induced hostile environment constructive discharge is a tangible
employment action that imposes strict liability on the employer.70 The
Supreme Court agreed with the Third Circuit’s decision that a claim of
constructive discharge was cognizable under Title VII.71 As to the imposition
of liability, the Court determined that the Third Circuit incorrectly held that an
employer is automatically liable when the employee claims constructive
discharge.72
The Court’s opinion, written by Justice Ginsburg, explained that it was
disinclined to hold that a claim of constructive discharge would always bar the
employer from asserting the Ellerth–Faragher affirmative defense.73 Rather,
the Court determined that employers should only be held strictly liable for
harassing acts of supervisors that would not be possible without the

64. Id. at 138.
65. Id. at 139. Suders’ complaint did not expressly allege constructive discharge, but based
upon allusions to being “forced to suffer a termination” in her complaint, the Third Circuit found
“[t]he allegations of constructive discharge . . . apparent on the face of Suders’s [pleading].” Id.
at 139 n.5.
66. Id. at 139.
67. Suders, 542 U.S. at 139. Note that this decision was consistent with the Third Circuit’s
prior rulings. See infra notes 158–62.
68. Easton, 325 F.3d at 461 (stating that disallowing constructive discharge as a tangible
employment action could have the “perverse effect of discouraging an employer from actively
pursuing remedial measures and of possibly encouraging intensified harassment”).
69. Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, available at 2003
WL 22428573 (U.S. July 14, 2003) (No. 03-95).
70. Suders, 542 U.S. at 140; see also Chamallas, supra note 16, at 310 (noting that lower
courts had difficulty deciding constructive discharge cases and that as such, a circuit split had
occurred).
71. Suders, 542 U.S. at 140.
72. Id. at 141.
73. Id. at 140–41.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2006]

THE SUPREME COURT GETS CONSTRUCTIVE

1251

supervisor’s agency relationship with the employer.74 The Court’s distinction
was driven by the concern that constructive discharges may be induced by acts
of employees, unofficial acts of supervisors, or official acts of supervisors.75
As such, the Court did not believe that a finding of strict liability was
warranted without greater certainty that the harasser was “aided by” his
position as a supervisor.76 The Court also stated that allowing an employer to
utilize the Ellerth–Faragher defense promotes deterrence, an underlying policy
of Title VII.77
III. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SUPERVISORY HARRASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII
A brief discussion of Title VII and its sexual harassment progeny is
enlightening for understanding the holding of Suders. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 is the law that initially made discrimination based upon sex
or gender illegal.78 Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
in the terms or conditions of hiring or employment based upon an individual’s
sex.79 Congress’s intent regarding gender as a protected class under Title VII
was to prevent occurrences that dissuaded women from employment
opportunities.80 Later courts recognized that the goals of equality for women
74. Id. at 148–49 (stating that “absent . . . an official act, the extent to which the supervisor’s
misconduct has been aided by the agency relation . . . is less certain”).
75. Id. at 148 (explaining that “harassment so intolerable as to cause a resignation may be
effected through co-worker conduct, unofficial supervisory conduct, or official company acts.
Unlike an actual termination, which is always effected through an official act of the company, a
constructive discharge need not be.”).
76. Suders, 542 U.S. at 148 (stating that “[a]bsent ‘an official act of the enterprise,’ as the
last straw, the employer ordinarily would have no particular reason to suspect that a resignation is
not the typical kind daily occurring in the work force”).
77. This is reflected in the affirmative defense requirement of a showing that the employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of the employer’s internal grievance procedure. Id. at 137–
38. As such the Court suggests that this requirement will encourage employers to have effective
procedures in place and encourage employees to report harassment. The reporting requirement
would then allow the employer to take appropriate corrective action before it escalates to severity.
See also Shari M. Goldsmith, The Supreme Court’s Suders Problem: Wrong Question, Wrong
Facts Determining Whether Constructive Discharge is a Tangible Employment Action, 6 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 817, 836 (2004).
Chief Judge Posner intimated that the mitigation standard embodies the same principle
underlying the Court’s tangible employment action. Judge Posner explained in his
concurring opinion that Ellerth’s “action in quitting rather than complaining underscores
the importance of agency principles that place appropriate pressure on victims of sexual
harassment to protect themselves . . . by complaining.”
Id. (quoting Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 123 F.3d 490, 516 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J.,
concurring)).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
79. Id.
80. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990). “The point of the
laws against sex discrimination is that women have a right to be in the workplace on the same
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in the workplace could only be achieved if women could work without fear of
harassment.81 When considering sexual harassment claims, courts are still
heedful of the fact that the primary purpose of Title VII is to avoid harm rather
than to provide redress.82
The concept of constructive discharge was originally developed by the
National Labor Relations Board to characterize situations where employers
essentially forced employees who were associated with unions to leave their
employ.83 Employers would create a constructive discharge by causing
employees to quit due to unbearable working conditions.84 The doctrine of
constructive discharge was recognized by, and firmly established in, the
federal courts by the enactment of Title VII.85 The constructive discharge
doctrine was utilized in Title VII cases beginning in the early 1970s.86 Since
that time, a wide range of constructive discharge cases under Title VII have
been recognized by the courts of appeal.87 The concept of constructive
discharge has been amended somewhat from the original National Labor
Relations Act when imported into employment discrimination suits. Whereas
the National Labor Relations Board decisions initially focused on the illegality
of the employer’s conduct when determining whether the employee was
constructively discharged, two additional requirements have been engrafted
into proof of a constructive discharge.88 One requirement utilized by some of
the circuits is a showing of intent on the part of the employer to cause the
employee to resign.89 Second, plaintiffs in all circuits must prove that their

terms as men.” GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF
EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 134 (2001).
81. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1483.
82. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06 (1998) (citing Albermarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)).
83. Suders, 542 U.S. at 141. The first case to use the term “constructive discharge” was In
re Sterling Corset Co., 9 NLRB 858, 865 (1938). Chamallas, supra note 16, at 357 n.196.
84. Suders, 542 U.S. at 141. See NLRB v. East Texas Motor Freight Lines, 140 F.2d 404,
405 (5th Cir. 1944) (first court of appeals case to hold that a supervisor-induced resignation is an
unfair labor practice); see also NLRB v. Saxe-Glassman Shoe Corp., 201 F.2d 238, 243–44 (1st
Cir. 1953) (first court of appeals case to give backpay award for constructive discharge).
85. Suders, 542 U.S. at 142; see also Cathy Shuck, That’s It, I Quit: Returning to First
Principles in Constructive Discharge Doctrine, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 402, 410 (2002).
86. Shuck, supra note 85, at 404 (referring to Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass’n.,
509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975) and Andres v. Southwestern Pipe, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 895 (D. La.
1971)).
87. Suders, 542 U.S. at 142. “[A]pplication of the constructive discharge doctrine to Title
VII cases has received apparently universal recognition among the courts of appeals which have
addressed that issue.” Id. at 142 (quoting Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co., 747 F.2d 885, 887
(3d Cir. 1984)).
88. Shuck, supra note 85, at 404.
89. Id.
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resignation was a reasonable response to the harassment.90 Note that the
second requirement serves to shift the focus of the “constructive discharge
inquiry” from the employer to the employee.91
A.

Constructive Discharge and Damages

The remedies originally available under Title VII to victims of sexual
harassment were expanded by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, codified at 42
U.S.C. 1981(a)(2000).92 The 1991 Act allowed for the award of damages for
intentional discrimination.93 The structure of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
utilizes compensatory damages as deterrence.94 By including monetary
damages as part of Title VII’s remedial scheme, Congress accentuated the fact
that monetary damages increase the employer’s potential costs for engaging in
intentional discrimination.95 The concept is that increased potential liability
will provide encouragement for extinguishing sexual harassment before
problems occur.96 Under the Act, damage caps are placed on the employer’s
future pecuniary losses, non-pecuniary losses, and punitive damages based on
the number of employees.97

90. Id.
91. Id. “The reasonableness of the employee’s response is generally evaluated by asking
whether the discrimination was more egregious than ‘ordinary’ actionable harassment, and
whether or not the employee, prior to quitting, gave the employer an opportunity to remedy the
harassment.” Id.
92. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 80, at 178.
93. Id. at 179 (referring to section 1981(a) of the United States Code). As such, the damages
available for sex discrimination are now more on par with the damages already available for
discrimination based on race and national origin. Id. at 178–79.
94. Nancy R. Mansfield and Joan T. A. Gabel, An Analysis of the Burlington and Faragher
Affirmative Defense: When Are Employers Liable?, 19 LAB. LAW. 107, 108 (2003).
Among the stated motivations driving the Act’s passage was “the need to overturn Price
Waterhouse [v. Hopkins],” 490 U.S. 228 (1989), which Congress believed had severely
undercut Title VII’s effectiveness. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I) at 45 (1991). In Price
Waterhouse, the Supreme Court held that an employer who made an employment decision
that was based on discrimination could escape liability if it could prove that it would have
made the same decision in the absence of discrimination. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S.
at 258. This holding undermined Title VII’s intent to completely eliminate intentional
discrimination.
Id. at n.13.
95. Id. at 109 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I) at § XI (1991)).
96. Id.
97. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 80, at 179. The amounts vary depending on the size of the
employer, from $50,000 for employers with 15 to 100 employees, to $300,000 for employers with
more than 500 employees. Id. Punitive damages are also used as a deterrent but are only
applicable to private employers. Id. As such, punitive damages will not be available to Suders.
Additionally, the applicability of punitive damages is based upon a showing that the employer
acted “with malice or with reckless indifference” to the rights of the plaintiff. Id.
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The significance of successfully proving a claim of constructive discharge
lies in the remedies available to the plaintiff.98 A plaintiff who can prove
constructive discharge may be able to recover backpay and frontpay, which are
damages that result from the job loss.99 Frontpay and backpay are of particular
importance because they do not have damage caps.100 The focus in
constructive discharge is whether a plaintiff was justified in resigning based
upon the circumstances. Thus, if the plaintiff is unable to prove constructive
discharge, that is, that she was justified in quitting, courts generally will not
allow her to recover the economic losses connected with her job loss.101 A
plaintiff will usually not be able to recover such economic losses even if the
plaintiff successfully demonstrates a hostile environment violative of Title VII
because her resignation would be viewed as an unreasonable response to the
situation.102 If the requirement were otherwise, employees would likely quit
under adverse situations rather than trying to correct the problem. Title VII’s
remedial scheme, that is, to prevent harm rather than to provide redress, would
not be advanced if employees were able to quit without having to mitigate the
situation.
B.

Progeny of Title VII Emphasizes Deterrence

Since the passage of Title VII, sexual harassment cases interpreting the Act
have continued to emphasize Title VII’s focus on motivating employers to
constrain discriminatory acts.103 As such, sexual harassment has evolved from

98. Chamallas, supra note 16, at 315.
[I]f the plaintiff is successful in proving [a] constructive discharge, she will be entitled to
recover two sets of damages: not only those damages flowing from the hostility of
supervisors and co-workers while on the job, . . . but also damages flowing from the loss
of her job—most notably, backpay and frontpay.
Id.
99. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 848 (2001). Courts usually
do not grant recovery for backpay and frontpay to plaintiffs who quit, unless they successfully
prove constructive discharge. Chamallas, supra note 16, at 315.
100. See Pollard, 532 U.S. at 848–54; Chamallas, supra note 16, at 317.
101. Chamallas, supra note 16, at 315.
102. Id.
103. Mansfield & Gabel, supra note 94, at 109; see, e.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477
U.S. 561 (1986); Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). The power theory presented by Catharine MacKinnon in 1979
has assisted the Court in recognizing sexual harassment as Title VII discrimination. See
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 57–99 (1979);
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982) (utilizing the terms quid pro quo
sexual harassment and “hostile work environment” which were developed by MacKinnon). The
idea of MacKinnon’s “power theory” is that women generally lack power equal to men in the
workplace and as such sexual harassment is a vehicle for men to retain greater power. See
MACKINNON, supra, at 59.
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recognizing basically only “quid pro quo” sexual harassment104 to recognizing
that Title VII’s purview includes “hostile work environment” harassment.105
Throughout the development of sexual harassment law, the Court has
steadfastly focused on the deterrent intent of Title VII to prevent harm.
An employee must first have experienced a hostile work environment
before a hostile work environment constructive discharge case can be
claimed.106 As such, it is important to review briefly the case that established
the concept of a sexually hostile work environment.
1.

Hostile Work Environment—Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson

The concept of a sexually hostile work environment was first recognized
by the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.107 In Meritor,
the Court determined that sexually harassed employees have a cause of action
under Title VII when the harassment is so pervasive as to create a hostile work
environment that alters the condition of employment.108 In so holding, the
Court specified that Title VII serves to prohibit discrimination committed by
employers, not to regulate the behavior of employees.109 The Court discerned
104. Black’s Law Dictionary defines quid pro quo sexual harassment as: “Sexual harassment
in which the satisfaction of a sexual demand is used as the basis of an employment decision.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1407 (8th ed. 2004). This type of harassment might occur, for
example, if a boss fired or demoted an employee who refused to go on a date with the boss. See
id.
105. Mansfield & Gabel, supra note 94, at 109; see also Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual
Harassment as Per Se Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 333–36
(1990). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “hostile-environment sexual harassment” as:
Sexual harassment in which a work environment is created where an employee is subject
to unwelcome verbal or physical sexual behavior that is either severe or pervasive. This
type of harassment might occur, for example, if a group of coworkers repeatedly e-mailed
pornographic pictures to a colleague who found the pictures offensive.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1407 (8th ed. 2004).
106. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 151 (2004).
107. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). It is interesting to note that Catharine A. MacKinnon, who first
coined the phrase “hostile work environment,” see supra note 103, assisted Vinson’s attorney on
the brief filed with the Supreme Court in Meritor. Linda Kelly Hill, The Feminist Misspeak of
Sexual Harrassment, 57 FLA. L. REV. 133, 147 n.74 (2005). In Meritor, a bank employee alleged
that her supervisor made demands for sexual favors, fondled her in front of other employees,
exposed himself to her, and forcibly raped her more than once. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60.
108. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66–67; see also Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 443 (3d Cir. 2003).
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Meritor brought sexual harassment mainstream attention and
influenced the highly controversial issues of the Anita Hill–Clarence Thomas hearings, the
Tailhook scandal, and President Clinton’s impeachment. See generally AUGUST B. COCHRAN III,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE LAW: THE MECHELLE VINSON CASE 166, 173–80 (2004).
109. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 71–72; RUTHERGLEN, supra note 80, at 129. The definition of
employer includes anyone who is acting as an “agent,” and as such, if an employee is harassing
and is acting as an agent of the employer, the employer is liable. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 80, at
129. It is also important to note though that liability under state law may render different results.
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that employers are not automatically responsible for all acts committed by their
employees.110 The Court utilized common law agency principles, specifically
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219,111 to determine when employers will be
liable for the acts of their employees.112 The Meritor Court tempered strict
application of agency principles with the remedial goals of Title VII in limiting
the liability of employers for the acts of their employees.113 Thus, Meritor
formulated a new analysis for whether the employer is vicariously liable for
supervisor harassment.114
One way in which an employer may be held vicariously liable for the
actions of its employees is where a supervisor creates a hostile work
environment. Meritor held that Title VII encompassed actions for hostile work
environments caused by supervisors.115 Meritor established that the “creation
or toleration of a hostile . . . working environment” due to a victim’s sex is
discriminatory harassment.116 The Meritor Court stated that the allegedly
hostile environment must satisfy two prongs. First, the environment must be
such that a reasonable person would objectively find it hostile.117 Second, the
victim must also have perceived the environment as hostile.118 Once this

See Misty L. Gill, The Changed Face of Liability for Hostile Work Environment Sexual
Harassment: The Supreme Court Imposes Strict Liability in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1651, 1690 n.414 (1999) (citing
Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 566 (7th Cir. 1997)).
110. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (stating that “Congress’ decision to define ‘employer’ to include
any ‘agent’ of an employer surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees
for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible”) (internal citation omitted).
111. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219–37 (1958).
112. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
113. Id. at 71–72. Meritor held that “agency principles constrain the imposition of vicarious
liability in cases of supervisory harassment.” Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,
763 (1998).
114. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70–72 (relying upon RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219);
see also Mansfield & Gabel, supra note 94, at 109.
115. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73.
116. Id. at 66–67.
117. See id. at 65.
118. See id. at 67–68. The victim is not required to establish economic or psychological
harm. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22–23 (1993). The victim must in fact find
the conduct offensive or unwelcome. MACK A. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION IN A NUTSHELL 157 (4th ed. 1999). Whether the conduct was subjectively
unwelcome is an issue of fact. Id. This means that a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position
would have found that the conduct created a hostile work environment. Id. at 158. Note, though,
that the Court has recognized that Title VII is not a “general civility code,” and that “ordinary
tribulations of the workplace, such as sporadic use of abusive language, gender related jokes, and
occasional teasing” are not actionable. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788
(1998). “Discourtesy or rudeness should not be confused with . . . harassment” and “a lack of . . .
sensitivity does not, alone, amount to actionable harassment.” Id. at 787. But note that the
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standard was announced, lower courts soon developed differing standards as to
applicability of vicarious liability based upon varying interpretations of agency
principles.119 The Meritor decision was an important beginning, but not a
long-term fix.
2.

Court Announces Affirmative Defense for Employers

The next major development in hostile environment jurisprudence that is
important to a discussion of the Suders decision came in 1998 from the twin
decisions of Ellerth and Faragher. Ellerth and Faragher made clear that under
some circumstances an employer may be held strictly liable for sexual
harassment committed by a supervisor.120
In Ellerth, Kimberly Ellerth was threatened with various adverse decisions,
including denial of a raise or promotion or even termination if she failed to
give her supervisor, Ted Slowik, sexual favors.121 The supervisor never
followed through with his threats, though, and Ellerth remained employed until
she ultimately quit.122 While the Seventh Circuit saw the situation as quid pro
quo harassment, resulting in strict liability, the Supreme Court ruled that
conduct itself need not be sexual in nature, sexually explicit, or motivated by sexual desire.
PLAYER, supra, at 159.
119. Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752–53 (1998); see also Mansfield &
Gabel, supra note 94, at 109. When lower courts applied Meritor, they began to use the terms
quid pro quo and hostile work environment as a standard for determining vicarious liability of the
employer. Id. at 111 (citing Davis v. Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365, 1367 (8th Cir. 1997); Nichols v.
Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 513–14 (9th Cir. 1994); Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106–
07 (3d Cir. 1994); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir. 1993); Kauffman v.
Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 185–86 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1041 (1992);
Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989)).
120. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 80, at 131.
121. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747–48. Ellerth claimed that Slowik made many offensive remarks
and gestures to her, but she placed emphasis on three particular situations where she took
Slowik’s comments to be threats to deny her certain job benefits. Id. Once when Ellerth did not
respond to comments Slowik made regarding her breasts, he said that she should “loosen up” and
told her, “[Y]ou know, Kim, I could make your life very hard or very easy at Burlington.” Id. at
748. Slowik later commented in a promotion meeting that Ellerth was not “loose enough” and
then reached over and rubbed her knee. Id. Ellerth received the promotion, but when Slowik
called to inform her of the promotion he told Ellerth, “[Y]ou’re gonna be out there with men who
work in factories, and they certainly like women with pretty butts/legs.” Id. After Ellerth was
promoted, she contacted Slowik to ask a question to which he responded, “I don’t have time for
you right now, Kim . . .—unless you want to tell me what you’re wearing.” Id. Ellerth ended the
call and when she tried to discuss the matter with Slowik a few days later he responded by asking,
“[A]re you wearing shorter skirts yet, Kim, because it would make your job a whole heck of a lot
easier.” Id.
122. Id. at 748. At the time Ellerth quit, she fashioned a resignation letter which gave reasons
for her departure that were unrelated to the harassment by her supervisor. Id. However, Ellerth
did submit a second letter, approximately three weeks after her resignation, stating that she quit
due to her supervisor’s behavior. Id.
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Ellerth’s situation was a hostile work environment.123 The Court ruled in
Ellerth’s favor and utilized the ruling to clarify how to determine the extent of
an employer’s liability when a supervisor is the harasser.124
The facts of Faragher are very similar to Ellerth except that Burlington
Industries was a private employer whereas the City of Boca Raton was a public
employer.125 Beth Ann Faragher was a lifeguard who experienced severe and
pervasive abuse from two of her supervisors.126 The City had a harassment
policy, but Faragher was never informed of or exposed to it.127 Justice Souter
authored the opinion for the same 7–2 majority that existed in Ellerth and
repeated Justice Kennedy’s Ellerth holding verbatim.128
Under the Ellerth–Faragher framework, if the harassment is accompanied
by a “tangible employment action”129 the employer is strictly liable for the
hostile work environment created.130 If the hostile environment is not
accompanied by a tangible employment action, the employer may assert the
affirmative defense and, if successful, avoid liability.131 To succeed on the
affirmative defense, the employer must establish that: (1) it “exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior,” such as having an effective, well-publicized harassment prevention
program and (2) “that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”132

123. Id. at 754 (stating that “[b]ecause Ellerth’s claim involves only unfulfilled threats, it
should be categorized as a hostile work environment claim which requires a showing of severe or
pervasive conduct”).
124. Id. at 754–66.
125. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998).
126. Id. at 780. The acts Faragher complained of included abuses to herself and other female
lifeguards. For example, one of the supervisors would put his arm around Faragher and his hand
on her buttocks. Id. at 782. Another supervisor informed Faragher that if it were not for a
physical characteristic that he found unattractive, he would have wanted to have sex with her. Id.
On a different occasion this same supervisor pantomimed the act of oral sex. Id.
127. Id. at 781–82. The City’s harassment policy was never disseminated among employees
of Faragher’s department. Id.
128. Id. at 807.
129. In Ellerth, the Court stated that “[a] tangible employment action constitutes a significant
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
130. Id.; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
131. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
132. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; see also Edward Felsenthal,
Justices’ Ruling Further Defines Sex Harassment, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 1998, at A1
(recommending four steps an employer can take to aid in utilization of the affirmative defense: 1)
“Tailor a sexual-harassment policy” appropriate to your business and include “real-life examples”
to illustrate situations the policy covers; 2) “Require every employee,” including all top
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The Court developed the Ellerth–Faragher defense in light of Title VII’s
goals of encouraging anti-harassment policies and grievance mechanisms.133
The Court determined that relating the liability to the employer’s efforts to
utilize effective grievance procedures would further Congress’s intent to
“promote conciliation rather than litigation” of Title VII controversies.134
Additionally, tying liability limitation to incorporation of effective preventive
and corrective measures serves Title VII’s deterrent purpose.135 The defense
encourages employees to report harassing behaviors before the environment
becomes “severe or pervasive.”136
3.

Founded in Agency Principles, Focused on Tangible Employment
Action

The Court’s analysis in Ellerth and Faragher was founded upon principles
of agency law.137 In Ellerth, the Court specifically discussed and quoted
executives, to take “customized training on sexual-harassment awareness”; 3) Explain the internal
procedures for victims to follow to file complaints, and promise to employ an external
investigator if required; 4) Regularly evaluate how familiar employees are with “corporate
sexual-harassment policies and complaint procedures”).
133. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764. Additionally, the creation of the affirmative defense supports
the primary purpose of Title VII, in that it is not to provide redress, but rather to avoid harm.
Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 461 n.18 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805–06).
134. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
135. Id.
136. Id. The moral of these cases is included in the EEOC Enforcement Guidance, which was
written in June 1999 to interpret Ellerth and Faragher. The EEOC Enforcement Guidance states
that “at a minimum,” a policy to prevent and protect should contain the following six elements:
1) A clear explanation of prohibited conduct;
2) Assurance that employees who make complaints of harassment or provide information
related to such complaints will be protected against retaliation;
3) A clearly described complaint process that provides accessible avenues of complaint;
4) Assurance that the employer will protect the confidentiality of harassment complaints
to the extent possible;
5) A complaint process that provides a prompt, thorough, and impartial investigation; and
6) Assurance that the employer will take immediate and appropriate corrective action
when it determines that harassment has occurred.
EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 26. This document’s precursor, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harrassment, N915.002,
(1990), written in March 1990 to interpret Meritor, is available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
docs/currentissues.html.
137. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756–65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793–94.
1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the
scope of their employment.
2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of
their employment, unless:
a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
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section 219(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.138 Section 219(2)
defines when a master is liable for the actions of his servant when the servant
is not acting within the scope of his duties; the Court discussed three standards
for imputing liability to the employer for the acts of the supervisor under §
219(2):
1) the intent standard (“the master intended the conduct or the
consequences”),139
2) the negligence standard (“the master was negligent or reckless”),140 and
3) the “aided in the agency relation” standard (“the servant . . . was aided
in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation”).141
The basis for the resulting tangible employment action rule in Ellerth and
Faragher is based upon the third standard (“aided in the agency relation”
standard). The Court recognized though that were this “aided in the agency
relation” standard to be strictly applied to employment cases, an employer
would potentially be liable for harassment committed by any persons within its
employ.142 The Court acknowledged that in some ways all workplace
tortfeasors are aided in the accomplishment of torts by the existence of the
agency relation. In other words, “[p]roximity and regular contact may afford a
captive pool of potential victims.”143 The Court considered that neither the
EEOC nor any of the courts of appeals to have considered the issue thought
vicarious liability was always the required result.144 Thus the Court
determined that when the “aided in the agency relation” standard is applied to
Title VII causes of action, “the existence of something more than the
employment relation itself” is required.145
The Ellerth Court found the “aided in the agency relation” standard to be
appropriate for determining when the employer should be liable for an act of a
supervisor. The requirement of something more than the employment
d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was
reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the
existence of the agency relation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
138. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758.
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(a) (1958).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.; see FRANCIS ACHAMPONG, WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW: PRINCIPALS,
LANDMARK DEVELOPMENTS, AND FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE RISK MANAGEMENT 50–51
(1999) (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) and its application to
hostile environment harassment).
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relationship is found in what the Court terms as a “tangible employment
action.”146 As such, the Court determined that when a supervisor causes a
tangible employment action to occur, the discriminatory or harassing action
could not have occurred without the agency relationship.147 That is to say that
the particular “tortious” harassment which was manifested through the tangible
employment action could not have occurred without the supervisor’s position
of power. Once a tangible employment action is established, the “aided in the
agency relation” standard for strict liability is also automatically established.148
Thus, for Title VII purposes, a tangible employment action by a supervisor
constitutes a tangible employment action taken by the employer.149
What then constitutes a tangible employment action? The Ellerth Court
stated that a tangible employment action is “a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits.”150 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) offers further guidance by providing examples of tangible
employment actions: hiring and firing, promotion and failure to promote,
demotion, undesirable reassignment, a decision causing a significant change in
benefits, compensation decisions, and work assignment.151

146. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760–61.
147. Id. at 761–62. Only a person acting with the authority of the company can cause this sort
of injury. Id.
148. Id. at 762. One should note though that even without a tangible employment action, the
employer will still face vicarious liability (although not strict liability) unless it can prove the two
elements of the affirmative defense. Id. at 766.
149. Id. at 762.
150. Id. at 761. This definition has been easily applied to the facts of many cases. Mansfield
& Gabel, supra note 94, at 115; see Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 153–54 (3d
Cir. 1999) (holding that taking away an employee’s office, dismissal of employee’s secretary, and
stealing an employee’s files is unequivocally a tangible employment action).
151. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance § IV(B). The Guidance defines tangible employment
action as “a significant change in employment status” and provides characteristics of a tangible
employment action:
1) A tangible employment action is the means by which the supervisor brings the official
power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates, as demonstrated by the following:
 it requires an official act of the enterprise;
 it usually is documented in official company records;
 it may be subject to review by higher level supervisors; and
 it often requires the formal approval of the enterprise and use of its internal
processes.
2) A tangible employment action usually inflicts direct economic harm.
3) A tangible employment action, in most instances, can only be caused by a supervisor
or other person acting with the authority of the company.
Id.
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The difficulty arose from the fact that constructive discharge was not listed
in the above examples from either the Ellerth case or the EEOC Guidelines.
Should constructive discharge be considered a tangible employment action?
This question was not easily answered and as such resulted in a split among the
circuits.
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT—IS A CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE A TANGIBLE
EMPLOYMENT ACTION?
As discussed above in Part III, the Ellerth and Faragher Courts held that
an employer is strictly liable for supervisor harassment that culminates in a
tangible employment action. As such, determining whether a constructive
discharge equates to a tangible employment action became very important
subsequent to the Ellerth and Faragher decisions. Whether a constructive
discharge was the equivalent of a tangible employment action was
determinative of whether or not the employer would be held strictly liable or
could present the Ellerth–Faragher affirmative defense in hostile environment
constructive discharge claims.
Unfortunately, after the Ellerth and Faragher decisions, lower courts were
still unclear as to whether or not constructive discharge was a tangible
employment action.152 Some courts treated constructive discharge as an actual
discharge. In other words, these courts equated a constructive discharge to a
tangible employment action.153 Other courts said that constructive discharge
did not rise to the level of a tangible employment action for which the
employer is held strictly liable.154 Some parties argued that the fact that the
Ellerth Court did not list constructive discharge as an example of a tangible
employment action155 was in itself telling.156 The circuits thus split when faced

152. Mansfield & Gabel, supra note 94, at 117.
153. Jackson v. Ark. Dep’t of Educ., Vocational and Technical Educ. Div., 272 F.3d 1020,
1026–27 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that constructive discharge constitutes a tangible employment
action); Cherry v. Menard, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1171–74 (N.D. Iowa 2000); Durham, 166
F.3d at 153 (finding that when sexually hostile work environment was so pervasive as to leave the
employee no choice but to resign, it is a constructive discharge that is tantamount to a tangible
employment action).
154. Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 294–95 (2d Cir. 1999).
155. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
156. See Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner
8, Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004) (No. 03-95), 2004 WL 110584
(“[T]his Court’s omission of constructive discharge in its discussion of tangible employment
actions was widely regarded as a purposeful one.”). Actually, the Suders Court indicated that
“[t]ellingly, we stated that Ellerth ‘ha[d] not alleged she suffered a tangible employment action,’
despite the fact that her complaint alleged constructive discharge.” Suders, 542 U.S. at 147 n.9.
But see Mansfield & Gabel, supra note 94, at 117 (stating that “[t]he Burlington court explicitly
stated that constructive discharge is a tangible employment action” when it listed that “[a]
tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring,

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2006]

THE SUPREME COURT GETS CONSTRUCTIVE

1263

with deciding the issue. Put another way, the split amongst the circuits
regarded whether employers should be held strictly liable when acts of
supervisors cause employees to quit their jobs.157
A.

Constructive Discharge Is a Tangible Employment Action

The Third Circuit held in Suders that constructive discharge is a tangible
employment action.158 The court noted that in so holding, the Third Circuit
was simply following its own precedent.159 Prior to the Suders decision, the
Third Circuit had already held that constructive discharge was a tangible
employment action in Durham Life Insurance Co. v. Evans.160 In Durham, the
Third Circuit did not look to whether a tangible employment action
precipitated the constructive discharge, but rather just to the circumstances of
the hostile environment.161 The Third Circuit reasoned that if the situation was
pervasive enough for the employee to resign, the constructive discharge was
the equivalent of a tangible employment action.162
The Eighth Circuit first had occasion to review the issue of whether a
constructive discharge constitutes a tangible employment action in Jackson v.
Arkansas Department of Education.163 The Eighth Circuit determined in
Jackson that the plaintiff had not been constructively discharged and as such
no tangible employment action had occurred.164 The Jackson opinion, in

firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits”); Marc A. Hearron, Employment Discrimination—Sexual
Harassment—First Circuit Holds That Constructive Discharge Is Generally Not a Tangible
Employment Action, Thereby Not Precluding the Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense—Reed v.
MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc., 57 SMU L. REV. 481, 485 (2004). Although the Ellerth listing
of examples of tangible employment actions does not specifically name constructive discharge, it
defines tangible employment action as “a significant change in employment status.” Id.
Constructive discharge falls within this definition due to the fact that the employer–employee
relationship ends. Id. “Moreover, Ellerth did list discharge as an example of a tangible
employment action, and constructive discharge is a type of discharge; it is treated under the law
as if the employer terminated the employee.” Id.
157. Chamallas, supra note 16, at 310.
158. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
159. See Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 153–54 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that
where plaintiff dealt with humiliating and sexist remarks, removal of her office and the
disappearance of her files, the hostile working environment was so pervasive as to leave the
plaintiff no choice but to resign, and as such, constructive discharge is equivalent to a tangible
employment action).
160. Id. at 153.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Jackson v. Ark. Dep’t of Educ., Vocational and Technical Educ. Div., 272 F.3d 1020
(8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 908 (2002).
164. Jackson, 272 F.3d at 1027; see also Campos v. City of Blue Springs, Mo., 289 F.3d 546,
551 (8th Cir. 2002) (saying that one who is harassed “must take affirmative steps short of
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holding that the plaintiff did not suffer a constructive discharge, noted that the
plaintiff had not given the employer a chance to rectify the problem.165 The
Eighth Circuit required a mitigation element for a plaintiff to succeed on a
claim of constructive discharge. In dicta, the Eighth Circuit intimated that had
Jackson proven the constructive discharge it would have constituted a tangible
employment action.166
The Eighth Circuit was faced with a similar decision in Jaros v. LodgeNet
Entertainment Corp.167 In Jaros, the jury concluded that the plaintiff was
constructively discharged.168 The Eighth Circuit held in Jaros, relying on the
above referenced dicta in Jackson, that constructive discharge was a tangible
employment action and therefore precluded the Ellerth–Faragher defense.169
This resulted in a finding of strict liability against LodgeNet.170 Essentially the
Eighth Circuit integrated a portion of the Ellerth–Faragher defense into the
plaintiff’s burden to establish the occurrence of a constructive discharge. The
plaintiff could not prove constructive discharge if she unreasonably failed to
take advantage of the employer’s internal grievance procedure.
B.

Constructive Discharge Is Not a Tangible Employment Action

At the opposite end of the spectrum from the rulings of the Third and
Eighth Circuits, the Second Circuit held that constructive discharge was not a
tangible employment action.171 Even though the Second Circuit found that the
employer had constructively discharged the employee, it still allowed the
employer to assert the Ellerth–Faragher defense in Caridad v. Metro-North

resigning that a reasonable employee would take to make her conditions of employment more
tolerable” before her resignation can be termed a constructive discharge).
165. Jackson, 272 F.3d at 1027 (stating that for a constructive discharge to be reasonable, “an
employee must give her employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the problem”).
166. Id. at 1026 (stating that “[i]f Jackson was in fact constructively discharged, then the
constructive discharge would constitute a tangible employment action and prevent the
Department from utilizing the affirmative defense”).
167. 294 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2002).
168. Id. at 964.
169. Id. at 966 (stating that “constructive discharge constitutes a tangible employment action
which prevents an employer from utilizing the affirmative defense”).
170. Id. The jury awarded Jaros $500,000 in damages, reduced by the court to $300,000, the
maximum allowable under Title VII. See John A. Gray, Is a Constructive Discharge Resulting
from a Supervisor’s Environmental Harassment a Tangible Employment Action?, 55 LAB. L.J.
179, 195 n.88 (2004).
171. Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 294 (2d Cir. 1999). The Second
Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to address whether constructive discharge is a
tangible employment action. See Goldsmith, supra note 77, at 825; see also Turner v.
DowBrands, Inc., 221 F.3d 1336 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (citing Caridad for the proposition
that “constructive discharge is not a tangible employment action for purposes of Faragher and
Burlington”).
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Commuter Railorad.172 In so holding, the court relied on the Supreme Court’s
analysis of agency principles in Faragher and Ellerth.173 The Second Circuit,
as did the Supreme Court in Ellerth and Faragher, focused on the “aided in the
agency relation” standard174 and reasoned that a constructive discharge could
be instigated by acts of co-workers as well as supervisors.175 The Second
Circuit also differentiated situations such as demotion or discharge as being
ratified or approved by the employer from a constructive discharge where an
employer would have no similar ratification.176
The Second Circuit also utilized Ellerth’s definition of a tangible
employment action.177 In Ellerth, the Supreme Court defined tangible
employment action as “a significant change in employment status, such as
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”178 The
Second Circuit took this list to be exclusive and thus lent particular credence to
the absence of constructive discharge as a behavior that constitutes a tangible
employment action.179 The Caridad court found this to have particular

172. 191 F.3d at 295. In so holding, the court noted it had previously stated that “[w]hen a
constructive discharge is found, an employee’s resignation is treated . . . as if the employer had
actually discharged the employee,” but stated that this holding was “in another context.” Id.
(citing Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1188 (2d Cir. 1987)). Lopez involved a claim
of discrimination based upon national origin. 831 F.2d at 1185.
173. The language reads, “A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants
acting outside the scope of their employment, unless: . . . (d) the servant . . . was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.” Caridad, 191 F.3d at 294 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(a) (1957)). The Caridad court also found
significance in the fact that Ellerth essentially alleged that she had been constructively discharged
and that in remanding the case the Supreme Court stated that “Ellerth ha[d] not alleged she
suffered a tangible employment action at the hands of [her supervisor].” Id. at 295 (second
alteration in original) (citing Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 766 (1998)).
174. Hearron, supra note 156, at 483–84 (stating that the “aided in the agency relation
standard was the primary basis for the new tangible employment action rule”).
175. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 294.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 294–95.
178. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. The Court further explained that in most cases, a tangible
employment action causes economic harm. Id. at 762. The Court then differentiated such
“official” supervisory acts from acts of co-workers. “But one co-worker (absent some elaborate
scheme) cannot dock another’s pay, nor can one co-worker demote another. Tangible
employment actions fall within the special province of the supervisor.” Id.
179. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 294. Later, when filing an amicus curiae brief in Suders, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce relied upon the omission as well. “[T]his Court’s omission of
constructive discharge in its discussion of tangible employment actions was widely regarded as a
purposeful one.” Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner 8, Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004) (No. 03-95),
2004 WL 110584.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1266

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:1243

relevance because the plaintiff in Ellerth herself had claimed, inter alia,
constructive discharge.180
C. Sometimes a Tangible Employment Action
The First and Seventh Circuits rejected the extremes of the Second Circuit
(constructive discharge is not a tangible employment action) and the Third and
Eighth Circuits (constructive discharge is a tangible employment action). The
First and Seventh Circuits did not see the question as an all or nothing
consideration. Instead the First and Seventh Circuits held that the employer
could claim the affirmative defense, unless the cause of the constructive
discharge claim was “an official supervisory act.”181 As such, a constructive
discharge finding did not automatically preclude use of the Ellerth–Faragher
defense.
The First Circuit in Reed v. MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc.,182 stated that
“the constructive discharge label cannot be used to preclude the affirmative
defense; but possibly, on rare facts, it might be appropriate for that purpose.”183
The First Circuit did not indicate what those “rare facts” might be. The facts
of Reed dealt with a supervisor who made sexual comments to the plaintiff and
pressed her to perform oral sex on him after babysitting for him in his home.184
Reed left her employment, returned a year later, and when the comments began
again, she reported her supervisor’s behavior.185 The court held that the
supervisor’s actions were “exceedingly unofficial and involved no direct
180. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 295; see supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
181. Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating that if “the
supervisor . . . is exercising official authority even if doing so for improper purposes . . . the
courts treat the act as that of the employer”). The Reed court did further add that different than
the Third, Eighth, Second, and Sixth Circuits, it saw “no reason to adopt a blanket rule one way
or the other.” Id. “Specifically, in circumstances where ‘official actions by the supervisor . . .
make employment intolerable,’ . . . a constructive discharge may be considered a tangible
employment action.” Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317, 336 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted).
182. Reed, 333 F.3d at 27.
183. Id. at 33; see also Hearron, supra note 156, at 485.
The court’s refusal to declare a bright-line rule, and its failure to give examples of what
“rare facts” may preclude the affirmative defense serve only to add confusion to an
already confusing issue. Following the court’s reasoning, it is difficult to conceive of a
constructive discharge context in which the court would disallow the assertion of the
defense.
Hearron, supra note 156, at 484 n.39.
184. Reed, 333 F.3d at 30. After Reed performed oral sex on her supervisor, the supervisor
told Reed that she should not tell anyone or they that would both be fired and that his family was
politically connected to the head of the company. Id. While the supervisor did not approach
Reed for a short while, he soon started making comments to her again and left green M&M’s on
her desk, requesting that she come to his house and babysit. Id. at 30–31.
185. Id. at 31.
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exercise of company authority.”186 In other words, the court determined that
the supervisor’s actions neither were, nor resulted in, a tangible employment
action. As such, strict liability was not imputed to the employer.187
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in Robinson v. Sappington,188 held that the
employer could not assert the affirmative defense where official conduct had
caused the constructive discharge.189 In Robinson, the plaintiff was a judicial
clerk who complained of harassment by the judge she worked for.190 The
judge told the plaintiff that he would transfer her, but that her new position
would not be pleasant.191 The judge then advised the plaintiff that it would be
in her best interest to resign.192 The court found that the plaintiff’s resignation
“resulted, at least in part, from [the judge’s] official action in transferring” her
to another judge who would intentionally make her job difficult.193 Thus, the
“official actions” discussed in Robinson seem to be the “rare facts” where Reed
suggested that a finding of constructive discharge would be warranted. The
Seventh Circuit took the position that a finding of supervisory official action
causing the constructive discharge would preclude utilization of the Ellerth–
Faragher defense.194
As such, the wide divergence amongst the circuits regarding whether or
not a constructive discharge does in fact constitute a tangible employment
action led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to resolve the inconsistency.195

186. Id. at 33.
187. Id. (stating that this supervisor’s “behavior is exactly the kind of wholly unauthorized
conduct for which the affirmative defense was designed”).
188. 351 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2003).
189. Id. at 337.
190. Id. at 320–24.
191. Id. at 324. Plaintiff alleged that the judge said her “first six months [in her new position]
probably would be ‘hell.’” Id.
192. Id.
193. Robinson, 351 F.3d at 337.
194. Id. (stating “because a jury could determine that Ms. Robinson’s decision to resign
resulted, at least in part, from . . . official actions in transferring [her] . . . and in suggesting that
she resign, we believe that it would be appropriate to hold the State of Illinois liable for Ms.
Robinson’s resulting resignation”).
195. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 140 (2004). “This Court granted
certiorari . . . to resolve the disagreement among the Circuits on the question whether a
constructive discharge brought about by supervisor harassment ranks as a tangible employment
action and therefore precludes assertion of the affirmative defense articulated in Ellerth and
Faragher.” Id. The Court particularly noted the Jaros, Caridad, Turner, Reed, and Robinson
decisions. Id.
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V. THE SUDERS DECISION
The issue that the U.S. Supreme Court faced in Suders was determining
whether or not a supervisor-induced constructive discharge amounts to a
tangible employment action for purposes of the Ellerth–Faragher
framework.196 The difficulty approached by the Court is the overarching
concept that a hostile work environment may be created without any actual
tangible employment action on the part of the employer.197 As such, the
Suders Court had to determine how the application of agency principles would
be weighted along with competing Title VII policy concerns of deterring
discrimination. The question facing the Court was whether a tangible
employment action occurred when the hostile work environment causes a
constructive discharge.198
In Suders, the Court concluded that when a supervisor’s official act is the
condition precedent to the constructive discharge, the employer will not be
able to utilize the Ellerth–Faragher affirmative defense.199 The Court also
stated that when no official act of the supervisor precipitates the constructive
discharge, the Ellerth–Faragher defense is available to the employer whose
supervisor is accused of sexual harassment.200
A.

Court Recognizes Constructive Discharge Under Title VII

The Suders opinion reiterated that Title VII is violated by “either explicit
or constructive alterations in the terms or conditions of employment.”201
Writing for the majority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that the concept of
constructive discharge was first recognized in the labor law context in the
1930s.202 The Court noted that the courts of appeals had long since recognized
constructive discharge claims in many different Title VII cases.203 The Court
196. Once again, the significance is that if constructive discharge is a tangible employment
action, the employer will be held strictly liable with no opportunity to raise the affirmative
defense. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (stating that “no
affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a
tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment”).
197. Examples of such would be hostile environments created by co-workers or, and most
significantly for this discussion, hostile environments created by supervisors through unofficial
acts, that is, acts essentially no different than those of other co-workers.
198. Suders, 542 U.S. at 140.
199. Id. at 140–41.
200. Id. at 145–46.
201. Id. at 143. “A constructive discharge occurs when an employee quits her job in response
to intolerable working conditions, often a sexually hostile environment.” Chamallas, supra note
16, at 309–10.
202. Suders, 542 U.S. at 141.
203. Id. at 142 (citing Moore v. KUKA Welding Sys. & Robot Corp., 171 F.3d 1073, 1080
(6th Cir. 1999) (recognizing constructive discharge in a case of race discrimination); BergstromEk v. Best Oil Co., 153 F.3d 851, 858–59 (8th Cir. 1998) (recognizing constructive discharge in a

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2006]

THE SUPREME COURT GETS CONSTRUCTIVE

1269

then referenced that the EEOC, as the federal entity that enforces Title VII, has
stated that “[a]n employer ‘is responsible for a constructive discharge in the
same manner that it is responsible for the outright discriminatory discharge of
a charging party.’”204 Based upon these considerations, the Court formally
recognized that employers may be liable for constructive discharge under Title
VII.205
B.

Reiterating Meritor

The Court next sought to determine whether the employer was liable for a
constructive discharge that resulted from a hostile work environment created
by a supervisor. The Court first looked to Meritor’s focus on limiting the
liability of employers for the acts of their employees through principles of
agency.206 The Suders Court recognized, as the Meritor Court had, that Title
VII serves to prohibit discrimination committed by employers, not
discrimination committed by employees in their individual capacities.207 That
is to say that for Title VII to have effect, the plaintiff’s claim must be against
the employer. The definition of employer includes anyone who is acting as an
“agent,” and as such if an employee is harassing and is acting as an agent of
the employer, then the employer is liable.208 Conversely, if the harassing
employee is not acting as an agent for the employer, then the employer is not
liable under Title VII.209 The significant step in the Suders decision is in
determining when an employer will be held strictly liable for an act of its
supervisors who are often regarded as extensions of the employer.
C. Court Resolves the Split, Focuses on “Official Act”
In Suders, the Supreme Court held that a constructive discharge constitutes
a “tangible employment action” when a supervisor’s “official act of the
enterprise” is the “last straw” which leads to the employee’s resignation.210
case of pregnancy discrimination); Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Assoc., 509 F.3d 140,
143–44 (5th Cir. 1975) (recognizing constructive discharge in a case of religious discrimination)).
204. Suders, 542 U.S at 142 (citing the EEOC Compliance Manual 612:0006 (2002)).
205. Id. at 143.
206. Id. at 143–45. See supra note 111 and accompanying text for a discussion of Meritor’s
utilization of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958). The Court discussed the
import of the fact that Title VII’s definition of “employer” includes the employer’s “agent[s].”
Suders, 542 U.S. at 144 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000)). “We viewed that definition
as a direction to ‘interpret Title VII based on agency principles.’” Id.
207. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 80, at 129 (citing to §§ 701(b), 703(a) of Title VII).
208. Id.
209. Suders, 542 U.S. at 145–46 (discussing the Court’s utilization of the “aided by the
agency relation” standard in developing the Ellerth–Faragher framework).
210. Id. at 147. “Absent ‘an official act of the enterprise’ as the last straw, the employer
ordinarily would have no particular reason to suspect that a resignation is not the typical kind
daily occurring in the work force.” Id. at 148. The Court was concerned with the Third Circuit’s
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The Court gave two examples of how this official act as the last straw is to
apply based upon the Reed and Robinson decisions.211 The Reed court
determined that the supervisor’s activities involved no official actions and
essentially were no different than harassing acts of other employees.212 Where
a plaintiff claims constructive discharge based on a supervisor’s repeated
sexual comments and sexual assault, assertion of the Ellerth–Faragher defense
is not precluded.213 Conversely, where the plaintiff in Robinson, after
complaining of harassment by her supervisor, was advised by her supervisor to
resign in light of her transfer option, the Court found that an official act
occurred.214 The employer may not assert the defense to such an official act
where the supervisor has brought the power of the organization to bear on the
plaintiff, thus qualifying the constructive discharge as a tangible employment
action.215 Essentially, the Court ratified the rationales advanced by the First
and Seventh Circuits in Reed and Robinson.
D. Ms. Suders, Your Harassment Is a “Worse Case” Scenario, but . . .
The Court found that Suders’ claim was of the same type as those in
Ellerth and Faragher.216 The Court actually termed Suders’ case as “a ‘worse
case’ harassment scenario, harassment ratcheted up to the breaking point.”217
Even with such a description of the Suders case, the Court still found that the
severity of the harassment was not determinative regarding preclusion of the
affirmative defense. Rather, the Court determined that employers should be
afforded the opportunity to establish the affirmative defense, in the absence of
ruling in that it essentially made a claim of hostile environment constructive discharge easier to
prove than its “lesser included component,” hostile work environment. Id. at 149.
211. Id. at 149–50. “We note . . . two recent Court of Appeals decisions that indicate how the
‘official act’ (or ‘tangible employment action’) criterion should play out when constructive
discharge is alleged. Both decisions advance the untangled approach we approve in this opinion.”
Id. at 149. “The courts in Reed and Robinson properly recognized that Ellerth and Faragher,
which divided the universe of supervisor-harassment claims according to the presence or absence
of an official act, mark the path constructive discharge claims based on harassing conduct must
follow.” Id. at 150. These examples demonstrate the significant role the “aided in the relation”
agency doctrine serves when the Court is determining whether to impute strict liability to an
employer. See supra notes 182–95 and accompanying text for facts of the Reed and Robinson
cases.
212. Suders, 542 U.S. at 150. Rather, the Reed court termed the supervisor’s actions as
“exceedingly unofficial and involv[ing] no direct exercise of company authority.” Id. (citing
Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2003)).
213. Id. at 149–50.
214. Id. (citing Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317, 337 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that the
plaintiff’s resignation was at least partially due to the supervisor’s official authority regarding her
transfer).
215. Suders, 542 U.S. at 150.
216. Id. at 147.
217. Id. at 147–48; see supra Part II explaining the facts of the case as alleged by Suders.
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an “official act” by the harassing supervisor.218 In Suders’ case, the Court
agreed with the Third Circuit that genuine issues of material fact did exist
regarding Suders’ claims of hostile work environment and constructive
discharge.219 The Court indicated in a footnote that while it found most of the
activities surrounding Suders’ complaint to be unofficial, the Court did find the
conduct surrounding her computer exam to be “less obviously unofficial.”220
The Court disagreed with the Third Circuit holding that the Ellerth–Faragher
defense was never available in constructive discharge cases.221 Although the
Justices reversed the Third Circuit on the central question, they upheld the
appellate court’s decision to revive Suders’ case so that the constructive
discharge claim could be reviewed on remand.222 The case was remanded for
further proceedings.223
In the second portion of the opinion, the Court clarified the burdens of the
parties.224 The Court wanted to provide guidance for the district courts when
determining pleading and persuasion burdens under the Ellerth–Faragher
framework.225 The Court stated that when a plaintiff makes a claim of hostile
environment constructive discharge and does not allege a tangible employment

218. Id. at 148–49.
219. Id. at 152.
220. Suders, 542 U.S. at 152 n.11.
221. Id. at 152.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 150–52. The Court noted that the Third Circuit had “imported” the Ellerth–
Faragher affirmative defense elements into the “anterior issue whether ‘the employee’s decision
to resign was reasonable under the circumstances.’” Id. at 150–51. The Third Circuit had stated
that “it may be relevant to a claim of constructive discharge whether an employer had an effective
remedial scheme in place, whether an employer attempted to investigate, or otherwise to address,
plaintiff’s complaints, and whether plaintiff took advantage of alternatives offered by
antiharassment programs.” Id. at 151 (alteration in original). The Court noted similar opinions in
other circuits at footnote 10.
For similar expressions, see, e.g., Jaros v. LodgeNet Entertainment Corp., 294 F.3d 960,
965 ([8th Cir.] 2002) (though not entitled to the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense,
employer facing constructive discharge complaint may assert that plaintiff “did not give it
a chance to respond to her [grievance]” in rebutting plaintiff’s contention that conditions
were so intolerable as to force her resignation); Marrero v. Goya of Puerto Rico, Inc., 304
F.3d 7, 28 ([1st Cir.] 2002) (“the jury reasonably can take into account how the employer
responded to the plaintiff’s complaints, if any” in deciding whether conditions were
intolerable); Hartman v. Sterling, Inc., No. Civ. A. 01-CV-2630, 2003 WL 22358548, *13
(ED Pa., Sept. 10, 2003) (noting “it is relevant,” but not dispositive, whether plaintiff
complained); Brief for Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. as Amici
Curiae 19 (affirmative defense unnecessary because of the “overlap between elements of
constructive discharge and of the Faragher/Ellerth [affirmative] defense”).
Id. at 151 n.10.
225. Suders, 542 U.S. at 152.
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action, the plaintiff has the duty to mitigate harm.226 If the plaintiff fails to
allege a tangible employment action, the defendant then bears the burden to
allege and prove that the plaintiff failed to mitigate.227
E.

Justice Thomas Dissents

The lone dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Thomas, focused on his
disagreement with the majority’s definition of a constructive discharge.228
Justice Thomas thought that the majority deviated from principles established
in the original conception of a constructive discharge as promulgated by the
National Labor Relations Board.229 The dissent noted that the conception of
constructive discharge arose from the particular situation where an employee
was coerced into resigning due to involvement in union activities.230 As such,
Justice Thomas explained that an employee must establish two elements to
prove a constructive discharge claim to the National Labor Relations Board.231
One, the employer must take actions against the employee that cause, and are
intended to cause, a severely unpleasant working environment, which results in
the employee’s resignation.232 Two, it must be shown that the employer’s
actions were in response to the employee’s union activities.233
From this historical perspective, Justice Thomas took issue with how the
majority construed a constructive discharge under Title VII.234 Justice
Thomas’s concern was that under the majority’s formulation, a person does not
have to suffer an adverse employment action to allege a constructive
discharge.235 Thomas disagreed with the majority’s divergence from the intent
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 153 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (taking opposition to the Court’s parameters for a
plaintiff to establish constructive discharge, that a plaintiff must “show that the abusive working
environment became so intolerable that [the employee’s] resignation qualified as a fitting
response”) (alteration in original).
229. Id. at 152–53.
230. Suders, 542 U.S. at 152.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 152–53 (citing to Crystal Princeton Refining Co., 222 N.L.R.B. 1068, 1069
(1976)).
233. Id. at 153 (citing to Crystal, 222 N.L.R.B. at 1069).
234. Justice Thomas referred to the fact that when constructive discharge was initially used in
the Title VII area, similar elements were required. Id. (citing Muller v. U. S. Steel Corp., 509
F.2d 923, 939 (10th Cir. 1975) (stating that a showing was required that “an employer
deliberately render[ed] the employee’s working conditions intolerable and thus forced[d] him to
quit his job”) (alterations in original)).
235. Id. Justice Thomas also noted and was concerned that “a majority of Courts of Appeals
ha[d] declined to impose a specific intent or reasonable foreseeability requirement.” Id.
(“[C]onstructive discharge occurs when the working conditions deteriorate, as a result of
discrimination, to the point that they become sufficiently extraordinary and egregious to
overcome the normal motivation of a competent, diligent, and reasonable employee to remain on
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requirement under the original formulation of constructive discharge within the
labor law context.236 As such, Thomas was concerned that the majority’s
definition did not limit recognition of constructive discharge claims to
occurrences where the actions were taken purposefully to instigate actual
discharge.237
Justice Thomas suggested that under the parameters of constructive
discharge announced by the Court, it would not make sense to attach the same
legal consequence to a Title VII constructive discharge as would be attached to
an actual discharge.238 Essentially Thomas suggested that to have a valid claim
of constructive discharge, an employee must prove that his employer subjected
him to an adverse employment action with the specific intent of forcing the
employee to quit. Otherwise, Justice Thomas advocated that where the alleged
constructive discharge results only from a hostile work environment, an
employer should be liable only if negligent.239 Under Thomas’s definition of
constructive discharge, he would have reversed the judgment of the Third
Circuit due to Suders’ failure to prove negligence on the part of the
employer.240
VI. EVALUATION OF THE SUDERS DECISION
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission states that
approximately 14,000 sexual harassment cases are brought to the commission
each year.241 The ability of plaintiffs to recover for constructive discharge has
the job to earn a livelihood and to serve his or her employer.”) (alteration in original) (citing
Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2000)).
236. Suders, 542 U.S. at 153.
237. Id. at 154.
238. Id. at 154. Rather, Justice Thomas agreed with the Court’s description of the
constructive discharge as being “more akin to ‘an aggravated case of . . . sexual harassment or
hostile work environment.’” Id.
239. See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 768 (1998) (explaining that the
employer is negligent only if the employer knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should
have known, about the harassment and failed to take remedial action) (citing Dennis v. City of
Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151, 153 (4th Cir. 1995); Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349
(6th Cir. 1988)). Justice Kennedy advocated a negligence standard based upon § 219(2)(b) of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency. “An employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if
it knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759.
240. Suders, 542 U.S. at 154 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that “[b]ecause respondent has
not adduced sufficient evidence of an adverse employment action taken because of her sex, nor
has she proffered any evidence that petitioner knew or should have known of the alleged
harassment, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals”).
241. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Sexual Harassment Charges:
EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1992–FY 2004, http://www.eeoc.gov.stats/harass.html (last
visited Nov. 12, 2004). Since 1991, though, this demonstrates approximately a 127% increase.
See New Light Shed on Sexual Harassment in the Workforce, http://mentalhealth.about.com/
library/sci/0202/blharass0202.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2006).
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opened new opportunities for damage awards.242 The Supreme Court is careful
to consider the balancing of incentives and consequences of giving such
incentives when formulating rules in the Title VII context. While the Court
did recognize an employer’s ability to still utilize the Ellerth–Faragher
defense, the Court also opened the door for plaintiffs to get around it. As such,
the Court did not adequately discuss what constitutes an official act that
imposes strict liability.243 Thus, the previous circuit split is likely to take a
new form—a split over what constitutes an official act on the part of the
supervisor. The courts will continue to struggle with when a constructive
discharge does and does not constitute a tangible employment action. A
consistent standard would provide all courts with a useful framework upon
which to try the facts before them. Title VII cases should not have drastically
different results dependent upon the circuit in which the case is tried.
A.

Formulation of Constructive Discharge and the “Last Straw”
Requirement

The Court’s formal recognition of constructive discharge under Title VII
was well-founded. Congressional intent with respect to women and Title VII
was to put an end to behaviors that kept women from accepting employment
opportunities.244 Suders continues the line of Title VII cases that seek to
achieve equality for women in the workplace by allowing them to work
without fear of harassment.245 The Court’s decision will also evolve with
changing trends of employment discrimination while still serving Title VII
purposes. For example, while the vast majority of sexual harassment victims
are women, men claiming sexual harassment is a trend that is increasing
significantly.246 The Court’s formal adoption of constructive discharge serves
to advance the Meritor rationale of allowing severely sexually harassed
employees a Title VII cause of action when harassment alters their conditions
of employment.247 As such, the Court’s recognition of the constructive
discharge concept in Title VII cases was justified and warranted.
242. See supra notes 93–102 and accompanying text.
243. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 152 n.11 (utilizing the phrase “less obviously unofficial”
conduct).
244. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
246. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, supra note 241 (noting that in
2002, 85.1% of sexual harassment charges were filed by women); Sexual Harassment of Men
Doubles in Decade, PERSONNEL TODAY, Sept. 28, 2004, at 10 (stating that of the sexual
harassment claims filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 2003, men
made up 15% of all charges). Almost 2,000 of the 13,566 charges were filed by men as compared
to only 958 in 1992. Id. Many of the claims filed by men involve males harassing other males.
Id. A car retailer paid $500,000 to former salesmen who claimed that they were harassed and
molested by male managers. Id.
247. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
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The Court’s definition of constructive discharge, while not identical to the
formulation under labor cases, is reflective of Title VII’s goals and policy.248
Justice Ginsburg stated that to prove constructive discharge, a plaintiff must
show that the offensive behavior was “sufficiently severe or pervasive” so as to
alter conditions of employment.249 If the working conditions would become
such that a reasonable person would be compelled to resign, the resignation
was a fitting response. Although this formulation of constructive discharge
means that one may allege a constructive discharge caused by “non-official”
conduct, such a situation is addressed through the employer’s application of
the Ellerth–Faragher defense.250 If the employer has attempted to have an
effective remedial scheme in place, the employer may be able to avoid
liability.251
Requiring that an official act of a supervisor precipitate the employee’s
resignation before strict liability will be imposed on an employer is consistent
with the Court’s previous rulings in Ellerth and Faragher.252 The “last straw”
requirement advances the idea that employers should not be held strictly liable
for all acts of their supervisors.253 Thus, although the Court did not impute a
direct intent requirement, the last straw requirement is consistent with the
established ideals of employer liability for hostile work environment as set out
in Meritor.254

248. See supra Part V.E regarding Justice Thomas’s concerns of the definition constructed by
the majority.
249. Suders, 542 U.S. at 146–47 (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
67 (1986)).
250. See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable
hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher)
authority over the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending
employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that
the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise.
Id.
251. Id.
252. “No affirmative defense is available . . . when the supervisor’s harassment culminates in
a tangible employment action . . . .” Id.; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807
(1998).
253. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804 (stating that “an employer is not ‘automatically’ liable for
[all] harassment by a supervisor”); see also Goldsmith, supra note 77, at 821.
254. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763–64 (noting that the Court is bound by Meritor’s utilization
of agency principles to “constrain the imposition of vicarious liability in cases of supervisory
harassment”; also noting that “Congress has not altered Meritor’s rule even though it has made
significant amendments to Title VII in the interim”).
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The application and availability of damages that apply to a constructive
discharge claim comports with the statutory intent of Title VII to avoid harm,
rather than to seek redress. The “last straw” requirement supports the idea that
an employee should stay working and seek redress unless conditions are so
pervasive as to extend beyond “ordinary” discrimination.255 As such, the “last
straw” requirement coincides with the employee’s duty to mitigate damages.256
Thus, the Court’s “last straw” requirement serves the deterrent intent of
damages set forth under the Civil Rights Act of 1991.257
While the Court’s definition of constructive discharge comports with the
ideals of Title VII, a definition that allows constructive discharge to be alleged
when no official act precipitated the resignation does not strictly adhere to
agency principles.258 In the context of sexual harassment claims, this issue is
adequately addressed by the employer’s ability to prove the Ellerth–Faragher
defense. The same result may not be assured where constructive discharge
claims arise in Title VII cases other than those involving sexual harassment. If
the Ellerth–Faragher defense is not applied by analogy to constructive
discharge cases covered under the purview of Title VII, the necessary limiting
factor of an official act as the last straw may not be required.259 Based upon
the “aided in the relation” agency concept, an official act as the “last straw”
should be mandatory in all Title VII constructive discharge cases.260

255. Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir. 1997). “In other words, the
plaintiff’s resignation is not truly voluntary if quitting was the only way she could extricate
herself from the intolerable conditions.” Id. “But unless conditions are beyond ordinary
discrimination, a complaining employee is expected to remain on the job while seeking redress.”
Id.
256. This is important because where a constructive discharge is proven, it is the functional
equivalent of termination with regard to damages. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S.
129, 146 (2004).
257. See supra notes 92–102 and accompanying text.
258. But see Goldsmith, supra note 77, at 185 (explaining that the Court in setting out the
Ellerth–Faragher defense also had to make adjustments to the application of agency law as
otherwise “a blanket application of the aided in agency relation principle might thus impose the
exact de facto rule of strict liability that Meritor rejected” as “there is a sense in which a harassing
supervisor is always assisted in his misconduct by the supervisor relationship”).
259. Cf. Williams v. Admin. Review Bd., 376 F.3d 471, 478–79 (5th Cir. 2004) (applying the
Ellerth–Faragher defense to whistleblower case); Mason v. S. Ill. Univ. at Carbondale, 233 F.3d
1036, 1043 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying Ellerth–Faragher defense to race discrimination case);
Hampton v. Gannett Co., Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 716, 720–21 (S.D. Miss. 2003) (applying Ellerth–
Faragher defense to religious discrimination case).
260. See supra notes 210–15 and accompanying text. Without the presence of the limiting
factor of an official act, such potential decisions would seem to support Justice Thomas’s concern
in the dissent, regarding the definition of constructive discharge promulgated by the Court not
resembling an actual discharge.
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Agency Principles

The inconsistent application of agency principles in Suders and the cases
leading up to it are of interesting note. While the Circuits seemingly
recognized the importance of the “aided in the agency relation,” as recognized
in Meritor, the interpretations of that requirement varied from circuit to circuit.
The Second Circuit interpreted the agency language to mean that a constructive
discharge was not a tangible employment action because it was “not
ratified . . . by the employer.”261 Whereas the Seventh Circuit interpreted the
“aided in the agency relation” requirement to mean a situation that could not
happen without official action on the part of the supervisor.262
The Supreme Court took the approach of recognizing that a constructive
discharge may occur due to a pervasive environment caused by co-workers or
by supervisors.263 In doing so, the Court acknowledged that not all conduct
committed by a supervisor is “supervisory” in nature.264 Conversely, the Court
correctly recognized that supervisors would be unable to effect certain
conditions on employees were they not aided by their relationship with the
employer.265 As such, the requirement of an official act is logical in that it
follows precedent of requiring something more than the existence of the
employment relationship itself for the employer to be liable.266

261. See Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 294 (2nd Cir. 1999).
262. See supra notes 188–95 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the
judge’s power in the Seventh Circuit’s finding of a tangible employment action in the Robinson
case).
263. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148 (2004).
Unlike an actual termination, which is always effected through an official act of the
company, a constructive discharge need not be. A constructive discharge involves both
an employee’s decision to leave and precipitating conduct: The former involves no
official action; the latter, like a harassment claim without any constructive discharge
assertion, may or may not involve official action.
Id.
264. Id. at 145 (noting that “there are acts of harassment a supervisor might commit which
might be the same acts a coemployee would commit, and there may be some circumstances where
the supervisor’s status [would] mak[e] little difference”).
265. Id. at 148; see also Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998)
(noting that “the supervisor has been empowered by the company as a distinct class of agent to
make economic decisions affecting other employees under his or her control”).
266. Suders, 542 U.S. at 144 (explaining that when a supervisor takes a tangible employment
action against the employee, more than the “mere existence of the employment relation aids in
commission of the harassment”). In Suders, the Court reiterated its concern from Ellerth, that
without an official act on the part of the supervisor, there is no certainty of knowing to what
extent the supervisor’s harassment was aided by the agency relation. Id. at 148; see also Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 760 (stating that an official act “shows ‘beyond question’ that the supervisor has used
his managerial or controlling position to the employee’s disadvantage”). The Suders Court
explained that uncertainty as to the supervisor being aided in his harassment by the agency
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The difficulty in applying the Suders decision lies in the fact that the Court
offers no clear definition of “official action.”
C. What Does “Less Obviously Unofficial Conduct” Mean?
The portion of the Suders decision that is most likely to be argued in the
future is located in the last footnote of the case. This is where the Court
explains that while most of the discriminatory conduct alleged by Suders is
clearly unofficial, the events surrounding her computer-skills exams and her
last day of employment were “less obviously unofficial” conduct.267 As the
Court did not clearly define the parameters of what can and cannot be
considered official conduct, it is likely that the Court’s open-ended
qualification of “less obviously unofficial” is likely to lead to further litigation.
It is easy to see where a new split may evolve based upon the wide divergence
of views among the circuits as to what qualified as a tangible employment
action.268 The varied interpretations as to whether or not constructive
discharge was a tangible employment action in the post-Ellerth–Faragher era
are a prime example of how this can occur.
While the Court did not define the parameters of what is an official act, the
Court did note some examples of where a constructive discharge has an
underlying official act. The Court said that official directions and declarations,
such as an extremely dangerous job assignment to retaliate for unreciprocated
advances, would qualify as an underlying official act.269 Another example the
Court offered was where a supervisor transfers the claimant to a department
knowing that the employee would be unwelcome there.270 Such occurrences
seem to be relatively limited in scope. Thus it is unlikely that the courts will
interpret the meaning of official act as restrictively as these examples might
suggest it should be.
1.

New Split Likely to Occur Over What Constitutes an Official Act

As was observed in the post Ellerth–Faragher era, even when the Court
strives to set out a clear definition of a term, subsequent interpretations can
lead to varied judicial results.271 Due to the ambiguity of the Court’s “less
obviously unofficial” language, varied judicial interpretations are likely to
relationship affords the employer the opportunity to affirmatively defend vicarious liability. 542
U.S. at 148.
267. Id. at 152 n.11.
268. See generally Susan Grover, After Ellerth: The Tangible Employment Action in Sexual
Harassment Analysis, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 809, 809 (2002) (arguing that courts ascribe
various meanings to the tangible employment action concept).
269. Suders, 542 U.S. at 150 (referencing the facts of the Reed case).
270. Id. (referencing the facts of the Robinson case).
271. See supra Part IV’s discussion of the circuit split precipitating the grant of certiorari in
Suders.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2006]

THE SUPREME COURT GETS CONSTRUCTIVE

1279

occur again. Such ambiguity will likely result in a new circuit split in which
the circuits differ on what does and does not constitute an “official act.” As
the “official act” term has significant consequences upon the path of a case and
because there have been varied interpretations in this area previously, the
Court should have offered clearer guidance regarding what makes an act
“official.”
An example of where such conflict may arise is the Suders case itself when
decided on remand. For example, the original determinations of the Middle
District of Pennsylvania Court would suggest that the district court would not
find the occurrence of official actions.272 Whereas the Third Circuit might
similarly find, as it originally did, that the acts of the police supervisors were
official based upon the Court’s direction to consider the circumstances of
Suders’ final day of employment.273 The Third Circuit previously concluded
that it could be found that the officers were trying to set Suders up on a “false
charge of theft.”274 The court even intimated that a false charge of theft would
be an effective way to get someone to resign under threat of being fired
otherwise.275
The Court has now clearly stated that a constructive discharge is not
automatically a tangible employment action. However, the employer’s ability
to assert the affirmative defense is still based upon whether or not a tangible

272. See Suders v. Easton, et al., No. 1: CV-00-1655, 2003 WL 22428573, 77a (discussing
defendants’ argument that the PSP had no actual notice of discrimination) (as found within
Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2003) petition for cert. filed, 2003 WL 22428573 (July
14, 2003) (No. 03-95); see also id. at 79a (discussing the plaintiff failing to contact the
Affirmative Action Office).
273. Suders, 325 F.3d at 446–47.
Any shred of doubt . . . is removed when considering the events of Suders’s final day on
the job. Drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, Suders presented evidence
sufficient to enable a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that the officers attempted to
set her up on a false charge of theft. The concealment of her test results in a set of
drawers in the women’s locker room, the use of theft detection powder to catch one of
their own inside the station, and the excessive and humiliating treatment that Suders
suffered when she was handcuffed and photographed all point to a pattern of conduct
designed to find some way to terminate Suders. . . . In other words, false charges of
misconduct are tantamount to threats or suggestions of discharge. Attacking someone
with a false charge of theft seems a most effective way of suggesting that an employee
will be fired or should leave voluntarily.
Id.
274. Id. at 446 (finding that the seeming set-up of Suders points to a grand plan to terminate
Suders).
275. Id. at 447–48. Conversely though, it is important to note that based upon Ellerth, the
Court seemed to indicate that an unfulfilled threat will not constitute a tangible employment
action. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 80, at 131. In Suders though, it could be argued that the threat
was fulfilled in that once the individuals believed that Suders was actually quitting, she was
released and no charges were filed.
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employment action occurred. Additionally, a constructive discharge is a
tangible employment action when precipitated by an official act. Because no
definite parameters of what constitutes official action have been drawn, the
Suders dispute is only partially resolved.
2.

Recommended Parameters of Official Act

In light of prior sexual harassment cases, there does seem to be some
indication as to what should and should not qualify as an official act. The fact
that the Court seemed to derive the basis for the meaning of official conduct
from the same basis as tangible employment action is partly due to the
differing meanings that lower courts have ascribed to the tangible employment
action term since the Ellerth and Faragher decisions in 1998.276
If courts are going to apply tangible employment action concepts to the
definition of official act, the courts may need to adopt a broader conception in
light of the constructive discharge claim. For example, the Court has
previously determined that economic decisions are tangible employment
actions.277 As such, where a supervisor takes official action that negatively
impacts the employee’s job-related economics, it would seem that a finding of
official conduct should be made. An example of an economic loss could
include a failure to promote that resulted in loss of future benefits.278 Thus, an
official act seemingly could actually be a form of failure to act so long as the
“imprimatur of the enterprise” was somehow obtained, in this example by
continually denying a promotion.279 Additionally, a situation where inaction
could qualify as an official act on the part of the supervisor could arise where a
transfer is repeatedly denied by the supervisor. Consider a case in which an
employee repeatedly asked for a transfer after having been hospitalized for
depression due to harassment from a co-worker.280 The supervisor refused to
consider the transfer requests.281 The employee ultimately resigned, sued and
was awarded $45,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive

276. See Grover, supra note 268, at 809. Grover argues that courts have often defined the
term “tangible employment action” too narrowly or have simply engaged in outcome-based
analysis. Id.
277. See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998) (referring to
economic decisions as tangible employment actions).
278. Suders, 542 U.S. at 144 (explaining that a tangible employment action “constitutes a
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits”).
279. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762 (discussing tangible employment actions being achieved via
the company’s internal processes and often obtaining the “imprimatur of the enterprise”).
280. DONALD H. WEISS, FAIR, SQUARE & LEGAL 204–05 (2004).
281. Id.
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damages.282 As such, it would seem that on specific facts, inaction might be
considered an official act based on the Suders decision.
Future parameters of what constitutes “official conduct” should also
include a situation where the supervisor creates a hostile work environment
with the specific intent of forcing a person to resign. A supervisor who
unintentionally creates a pervasive environment, which may or may not impute
vicarious liability to the employer, is very different from a situation where a
supervisor intentionally sets out to force an employee to quit.283 If the
developing definition of “official conduct” does not encompass such examples
in the future, the concept of constructive discharge in the employment context
will have digressed.284
As the parameters of “official conduct” become more defined through case
law, courts should be mindful that for an official act to occur, the supervisor
must be enabled by his agency relationship with the employer.285 Courts must
recognize that no matter what parameters are developed for an official act, a
fact-intensive inquiry will be required.286 Additionally, courts must be sure to
separate the proof required for a constructive discharge, regardless of whether
it was caused by official supervisory conduct, from the proof required to
determine whether an official act was taken. This required distinction was
made clear by the Court’s explanation of the burdens of persuasion.
D. Burdens of Persuasion
Prior to the Suders decision, the district courts were unclear at what point
in the case that consideration should be given to the employee’s duty to
mitigate and the employer’s duty to have an effective remedial scheme in
place.287 The Court clarified these requirements in the second part of the

282. Id.
283. Gray, supra note 170, at 191–92.
284. Cf. Sarah H. Perry, Enough is Enough: Per Se Constructive Discharge for Victims of
Sexually Hostile Work Environments Under Title VII, 70 WASH. L. REV. 541, 542 (1995)
(arguing pre-Suders that a per se rule should exist that would require finding a constructive
discharge when a sexually hostile work environment is found).
285. See Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher
Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 198 (2004) (suggesting that “lower federal
courts have interpreted the elements of the affirmative defense so as to reward employers for
engaging in behaviors that have little effect on the incidence of workplace harassment”).
286. See Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 446–47 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing the sufficiency of
allegations Suders made in claiming a supervisor-induced constructive discharge).
287. As to this issue, the Third Circuit had previously stated that
it may be relevant to a claim of constructive discharge whether an employer had an
effective remedial scheme in place, whether an employer attempted to investigate, or
otherwise to address, plaintiff’s complaints, and whether plaintiff took advantage of
alternatives offered by antiharassment programs.
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Suders opinion. The Court established that following Ellerth and Faragher, if
there is no tangible employment action, the plaintiff has a duty to mitigate.288
The defendant has the burden to “allege and prove that the plaintiff failed” to
mitigate.289 These requirements effectuate Title VII’s deterrent purposes of
encouraging employers to have anti-harassment programs and effective
grievance mechanisms which in turn advance Title VII’s goal of eradicating
discrimination in the workplace.290
The establishment of the burdens on the parties serves to clarify at what
point in the case each of these issues should be taken into consideration.
Whereas before the burdens were laid out, some courts would try to import the
issue of mitigation to a finding of whether the plaintiff’s resignation was
reasonable under the circumstances.291 Under Suders it is now clear that a
plaintiff may allege a constructive discharge in the absence of official conduct
on the part of the employer. If the plaintiff alleges constructive discharge
unaccompanied by an official act, then there is no tangible employment action
and the employer may assert the Ellerth–Faragher affirmative defense. Under
the affirmative defense, it is the duty of the employer to prove that the plaintiff
failed to mitigate. As such, the elements of the affirmative defense should not
be considered until the burden has shifted to the defendant. Therefore, the
elements of the affirmative defense should not be used to determine whether
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 151 (2004). The confusion regarding how the
elements of the defense were to be utilized may have been partly derived from the following
language in Faragher:
While proof that an employer had promulgated an anti-harassment policy with complaint
procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated
policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any
case when litigating the first element of the defense. And while proof that an employee
failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not
limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided y the
employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s
burden under the second element of the defense.
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (2004).
288. Suders, 542 U.S. at 152. The Court went on to explain that the “plaintiff might elect to
allege facts relevant to mitigation in her pleading or to present those facts in her case in chief, but
she would do so in anticipation of the employer’s affirmative defense, not as a legal requirement.”
Id.
289. Id.; see also Easton, 325 F.3d at 438 (regarding Suders interactions with EEO Officer).
290. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806 (discussing that the EEOC seeks to recognize employers
who make reasonable efforts to prevent violations and noting that the employee as a victim has a
duty “to use such means as are reasonable under the circumstances to avoid or minimize
damages”) (citation omitted).
291. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 151 (“[I]t may be relevant to a claim of constructive discharge
whether an employer had an effective remedial scheme in place, whether an employer attempted
to investigate, or otherwise to address, plaintiff’s complaints, and whether plaintiff took
advantage of alternatives offered by anti-harassment programs.”) (quoting Easton, 325 F.3d at
462).
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the employee’s decision to resign was reasonable under the circumstances.292
Rather, reasonableness of the resignation for constructive discharge purposes
should focus on the pervasiveness of the allegedly hostile environment. In this
way, courts should approach the decision as to whether a constructive
discharge exists in a consistent manner.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS IN LIGHT OF SUDERS
A.

Legislated Sexual Harassment Prevention Training

As evidenced by the statistics from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, sexual harassment is a problem which continues to plague the
workforce of this nation.293 As such, it would be appropriate to statutorily
mandate training on harassment issues.294 Some states have already enacted
laws that require the general workforce to receive sexual harassment
prevention training and separate sexual harassment training for supervisors.295
292. See id. at 150–51.
293. During fiscal year 2004, the EEOC received 13,136 sexual harassment charges. The
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Sexual Harassment, http:www.eeoc.gov/
types/sexual_harassment.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2006) [hereinafter Sexual Harassment].
Approximately fifteen percent of the charges were filed by males. Id. The EEOC resolved
13,786 sexual harassment charges in fiscal year 2004 and recovered $37.1 million in monetary
benefits for charging parties and other aggrieved individuals. Id. Additionally, “[s]tudies suggest
anywhere between 40-70% of women and 10-20% of men have experienced sexual harassment in
the workplace.”
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace and in Education,
http://womensissues.about.com/cs/sexdiscrimination/a/sexharassstats.htm (last visited Feb. 7,
2005). One academic argues that the disparity suggests a clear “gap between the intent of sexual
harassment policies and the enactment of those policies.” Debbie Dougherty, Sexual Harassment
as [Dys]Functional Process: A Feminist Standpoint Analysis, 29 J. APPLIED COMM. RES. 372,
373 (2001). Her suggestion is that all employees be trained regarding sexual harassment
especially in light of the fact that most harassment is peer to peer rather than from managers. Id.
Note that while ninety-seven percent of organizations report having sexual harassment policies,
overall sexual harassment charges filed with the EEOC have increased over 125% since 1991. Id.
at 373.
294. Such a requirement would not appear to be overly burdensome based on a 1999 survey
conducted by the Society for Human Resource Management, which stated that sixty-two percent
of companies surveyed offered harassment prevention training programs. Sexual Harassment in
the Workplace and in Education, supra note 293; see also Michael W. Johnson, Harassment and
Discrimination Prevention Training: What the Law Requires, 55 LAB. L.J. 119, 119 (2004)
(advising that after three United States Supreme Court cases, Burlington v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
(1998), Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 542 U.S. 775 (1998), and Kolstad v. American Dental
Association, 527 U.S. 526 (1999), employers may no longer use harassment and discrimination
prevention training as a luxury).
295. Judy Greenwald, California Law Mandates Periodic Manager Training on Harassment
Issues, BUS. INS., Oct. 25, 2004, at 4. Of the states with existing sexual harassment training laws,
Connecticut’s is the most similar to the new California law. Id. Connecticut’s law has been in
effect since 1993 and “calls for an initial two hours of training, but does not require that it be
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For example, California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger recently signed into law
a bill requiring employers to provide two hours of sexual harassment training
to supervisors bi-annually.296 Currently, this is the “most rigorous” legislation
of its type in the nation.297 The intent of the California legislation is that the
required training will ultimately reward employers in terms of decreased
litigation costs.298 Although providing the training will not automatically
insulate employers from suit, some California attorneys believe that
conducting sexual harassment prevention training may help employers avoid
punitive damages.299
While comparable federal legislation would likely be met with some
resistance,300 the ultimate goals of both Title VII and judicial opinions would

repeated, although employers are encouraged by the Connecticut Human Rights Commission to
provide updates every three years.” Id.; see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28–51–3 (2003) (encouraging
employers to conduct training on sexual harassment, “including, but not limited to supervisory or
managerial personnel”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-54(15) (2004) (authorizing the Human Rights
and Opportunities Commission to require an employer having fifty or more employees to provide
two hours of sexual harassment training and requiring supervisory employees to be trained on
sexual harassment within six months of assuming a supervisory position); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 151B, § 3A(e) (1999) (encouraging employers to conduct training programs which
address “the specific responsibilities of supervisory and managerial employees and the methods
that such employees should take to ensure immediate and appropriate corrective action in
addressing sexual harassment complaints”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495h(f) (2003)
(encouraging employers to conduct a training program regarding sexual harassment, which
includes “the specific responsibilities of supervisory and managerial employees and the methods
that these employees must take to ensure immediate and appropriate corrective action in
addressing sexual harassment complaints”). Note also that even states that do not statutorily
require training may interpret training as essential. See Gaines v. Bellino, 801 A.2d 322, 330
(N.J. 2002) (stating that state courts should consider whether the employer provided harassment
training as to whether the employer was negligent in preventing harassment); see also Carol M.
Merchasin, et al., Case Dismissed! Taking Your Harassment Prevention Training to Trial, NEW
JERSEY LAW., Oct. 2005, at 42.
296. Greenwald, supra note 295. The requirement is limited to employers with 50 or more
employees and the “training must include information and practical guidance on federal and state
statutory provisions concerning sexual harassment, and practical examples aimed at preventing
harassment.” Id.; see CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12950.1(a) (2005).
297. Greenwald, supra note 295.
298. Id. While some employers opposed the legislation as adding additional cost to their total
production costs, Joe Gibbons of FutureWork Institute suggests that the California lawyers
consider it in terms of payoff. “One lawsuit can really bring a company down, especially a
smaller company.” Id.; see also Felsenthal, supra note 132 (suggesting that thorough and
continued sexual harassment training will be helpful when asserting the Ellerth–Faragher
affirmative defense).
299. Greenwald, supra note 295.
300. Id. (noting that one California employer opposed the legislation because it means two
hours of lost productivity per year per employee).
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be served by enacting such a law.301 As stated by the EEOC, “[p]revention is
the best tool to eliminate sexual harassment in the workplace.”302 The EEOC
suggests that this can be accomplished via effective communication to
employees of the employer’s intolerance of sexual harassment.303 The EEOC
suggests that communication of anti-harassment policies is most effectively
achieved through sexual harassment training.304 The costs that employers
would incur to conduct sexual harassment training would be justified by the
employer’s cost savings resulting from decreased negative effects of sexual
harassment.305 In light of the legislature’s actions in other discrimination
areas, as well as federally mandated Occupational Safety and Health
Administration and Environmental Protection Agency training, such actions
would not seem disproportionate to the problem.
B.

Supervisors

As noted by the Faragher court, “When a fellow employee harasses, the
victim can walk away or tell the offender where to go, but it may be difficult to
offer such responses to a supervisor, whose ‘power to supervise’—to hire and
fire, and to set work schedules and pay rates—does not disappear . . . when he
chooses to harass through insults and offensive gestures rather than directly
with threats of firing or promises of promotion.”306

301. While Title VII and related legislation purports to remedy discrimination, “their primary
purpose is to prevent violations.” EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 26.
302. Sexual Harassment, supra note 293. Suders is an example of a need for content of the
training to be addressed, as PSP’s own equal employment opportunity officer evidently was
unclear on the proper avenues to effect prevention, demonstrated by her hesitance to follow up
with Suders regarding her concerns. See supra notes 34–38 (discussing Suders’ attempts to seek
assistance from PSP’s equal employment opportunity officer).
303. Sexual Harassment, supra note 293.
304. Id. “Policies have little value unless training informs managers about the policies and
how to administer them.” WEISS, supra note 280, at 194.
305. This seems especially true in light of costs of lawsuits. In fiscal year 2003 the EEOC
“recovered $37.1 million in monetary benefits for charging parties and other aggrieved
individuals (not including benefits obtained through litigation). Id. Additionally important to
consider in terms of constructive discharge, is that as of December 2000 in “38% of constructive
discharge cases, the median award for punitive damages was $300,000.” Is It Time to Try EPLI?,
HRFOCUS, Dec. 2000, at 7.
306. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998) (citing Susan Estrich, Sex at
Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 854 (1991)). In the portion of Estrich’s work which the Faragher
Court cited, Estrich was actually criticizing the holding of Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th
Cir. 1982). The Henson court stated that the capacity of a supervisor to create a hostile work
environment was not enhanced through the authority granted the supervisor by the employer. 682
F.2d at 910.
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In light of the Suders ruling, employers must be cognizant of the
precarious legal situations in which their supervisors may place them.307
Organizations must be sure to keep legal implications in mind when recruiting,
selecting, hiring, and training supervisors.308 As demonstrated by the Court’s
holding in Suders, official conduct of supervisors will now be imputed to the
employer and as such the employer must respond appropriately or face the
consequences for failure to do so. Thus, even if no legislative initiative is
advanced nation-wide or in an employer’s particular state, the employer should
voluntarily train its workforce regarding sexual harassment prevention. This is
especially important in light of the evolving concept of what sexual harassment
includes: sexual attraction or motivation need not be involved,309 the increase
in men being harassed,310 and same-sex harassment.311 Employment attorneys
advising employers will be well-served by counseling their clients as to the
importance of the role that supervisors play within their organizations.
As such, it is important for employers to recognize that minor job
assignments to undesirable positions may not, in and of themselves, constitute
a tangible employment action.312 However, many lesser job changes occurring
over a span of time could create a hostile working environment.313 This is
because the minor job actions could not have occurred absent the official

307. See Sexual Harassment, supra note 293 (stating that a telephone poll of 782 workers
conducted by Louis Harris and Associates showed that of the thirty-one percent of female
employees who claim to have been harassed at work, forty-three percent of those claimed to be
harassed by supervisors and another twenty-seven percent claimed to be harassed by an employee
senior to them; additionally “approximately 11% of claims involve men filing against female
supervisors”).
308. The Faragher Court noted that
recognition of employer liability when discriminatory misuse of supervisory authority
alters the terms and conditions of a victim’s employment is underscored by the fact that
the employer has a greater opportunity to guard against misconduct by supervisors than
by common workers; employers have greater opportunity and incentive to screen them,
train them, and monitor their performance.
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803. Labor Law scholar Charles Craver, of George Washington University
Law School, interpreted the Court as sending a message to employers with the Suders ruling that
employers should be careful in the way supervisors are hired and in the way that they themselves
are supervised. Marcia Coyle, Mixed Outcome: Workplace Ruling Has Something for Each Side,
N.Y. L.J., June 24, 2004, at 8.
309. See Sandra M. Tomkowicz, Hostile Work Environments: It’s About the Discrimination,
Not “The Sex,” 55 LAB. L.J. 99–100 (2004).
310. See supra note 246 (discussing that the amount of men claiming harassment is increasing
steadily).
311. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 75 (1998) (holding that
sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII).
312. PLAYER, supra note 118, at 155–56.
313. Id.
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power conveyed to the supervisor by the employer.314 As such, a finding of
such a series of acts amounting to a tangible employment action would
preclude the employer from raising the Ellerth–Faragher affirmative defense.
All supervisors should be trained to immediately report any and all
allegations of harassment, discrimination or any other unlawful conduct that an
employee might raise with regard to their resignation.315 Supervisors should
take all complaints seriously, and then should act immediately to take whatever
corrective action is needed.316 Additionally, supervisors should closely
monitor the behavior of those within their charge and ensure that unlawful
harassment is not a part of any subordinate’s working conditions.317
VIII. CONCLUSION
“Ever since the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, courts have
been struggling to articulate a coherent framework for conceptualizing and
recognizing claims of sex discrimination.”318 The evolution of Title VII’s
progeny with respect to sexual harassment continues with the Suders decision.
The Suders decision furthers the objectives and policy considerations promoted
in the pathmarking opinions of Meritor, Ellerth, and Faragher. The Court’s
requirement of an official act by the supervisor as the last straw for strict
liability to be imputed to the employer is consistent with the rationale of
Ellerth and Faragher. Title VII policy considerations and agency principles
are served by requiring something more than the existence of the employment
relationship itself. Additionally, the Court’s utilization of the employer’s
efforts to install effective remedial programs furthers Congress’s intent to
promote conciliation rather than litigation of Title VII controversies.
The restriction of the Suders decision remains in its lack of defined
parameters as to what constitutes an official act. As the employer will be held
strictly liable for constructive discharge only where an official act precipitated
the resignation, the meaning ascribed to the “official act” concept will be
pivotal. Additionally, the parameters of an official act for constructive
discharge purposes should encompass such issues as specific intent of
encouraging the resignation and inaction on the part of the supervisor. As
courts interpret the meaning of official act, they should be mindful of the
concept that for an employer to be held strictly liable the supervisor must have
been enabled by the agency relationship to engage in the harassing behavior.

314. For example, employers will be well-advised to scrutinize “requests for demotions,
significant cuts in pay and transfers to intolerable-type jobs.” Margaret M. Clark, Ruling Allows
Defense in Harassment Cases, HRMAGAZINE, Aug. 2004, at 30.
315. See generally Jonathan A. Segal, I Quit! Now Pay Me, HRMAGAZINE, Oct. 2004, at 129.
316. FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDELINES, supra note 37, at 3.
317. Id.
318. Tomkowicz, supra note 309, at 99.
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Federal legislation mandating routine training of supervisors would
advance the goals and policies of Title VII. Even in the absence of such a
requirement existing in a particular state, employers would be well-served to
offer sexual harassment prevention training, if not to the entire workforce, then
at least to the supervisors. Employers should also approach hiring and
promoting supervisors with caution. On a final note for those who are
harassed and contemplate resignation, a plaintiff’s case still seems to be best
served by trying to mitigate. Even if it is not always an absolute requirement,
don’t just quit, complain.319
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